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Abstract
By lots of economists and central banks, price stickiness is believed to be the main
factor which brings about the non-neutrality of money. Based on the belief, most
of the New Keynesian models are developed to feature price stickiness in order to
make the real effect of money. Among those, the Calvo pricing has been the most
popular framework in featuring the sticky price. This thesis investigates whether
the non-neutrality of money is always guaranteed by the Calvo-type price stickiness
or not. In particular, the focus lies on the effect of volatility of firms’ optimal
prices on the relationship between price stickiness and the non-neutrality of money.
Chapter 1 presents the theoretical possibility of the non-relationship between the
two phenomenons in such case that repricing firms’ optimal prices are very volatile,
and the following two chapters propose more micro-founded endogenous frameworks
to deliver the results which support the argument in Chapter 1.
It is shown in Chapter 1 that high volatility of reset prices has the same effect
as that of lowering the degree of price stickiness and increasing the future discount
factor in the standard Calvo framework. Due to the effect, it can be illustrated
that the aggregate price level can be flexible even when some firms maintain the
previous price level if the other repricing firms’ prices respond very elastically to
monetary shocks. Chapter 2 proposes a model in which repricing firms behave
as in collusion and exploit the information on aggregate price dynamics by taking
the aggregate price as a function of their own price at the process of optimization.
It is shown that the colluding firms set much higher prices for monopoly gains
against positive monetary shocks, and therefore, the aggregate price level can be
very responsive even with price stickiness of the firms. Lastly, Chapter 3 presents
the case where firms have no information on other firms’ pricing behaviours and
have expectations on average reset price with bounded rationality. The model of
this chapter demonstrates that the realized level of average reset price of the firms
can be much higher than that of the standard model when their expectations are
heterogeneous.
All the results of the chapters imply that the monetary policy might not be
able to have the real effect even with price stickiness if firms’ reset prices show
very volatile movements. Therefore, economists and central banks should research
more on the volatility of firms’ reset prices when analysing monetary policy and also
try to find other factors which might have direct relationship with the rigidity of
aggregate price, rather than price stickiness which focuses just on individual prices,
when developing a monetary model.
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Chapter 1
Volatility of Optimal Price and
Inflation Rigidity
1.1 Introduction
In most countries, central banks implement various monetary policies with the pur-
pose of attenuating the fluctuation of the economy based on the belief that money
has real effects on the economy. At least in the short-run, the central banks’ belief of
the non-neutrality of money seem to be credible since we can observe that aggregate
price does not respond quickly to monetary shocks, and therefore, output in the
economy changes significantly. Also, it is not hard to find an economist who sup-
ports the belief; a decent number of economists accept the inflation rigidity against
monetary shocks.1 For example, Romer and Romer (2004) show the effectiveness of
monetary policy using the data of narrative in the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) present the econometric
evidence of the non-neutrality of money using the VAR with the data of federal
funds rate.
However, even though we accept the belief that money has a real effect on the
1In this chapter, “real effect of money” and “non-neutrality of money” are used in much the
same sense. Also, “inflation rigidity” and “rigid aggregate price level” have the same meaning in
describing one side of the economy when money is non-neutral.
1
economy, it can be still asked what makes the non-neutrality of money. Regarding
this issue, many economists seem to find the reason for the real effect of money in
price stickiness of individual firms, though the cause of price stickiness is another
problem. For example, Ball and Mankiw (1994), who are considered as one of the
representatives of those economists, say: “We believe that price stickiness is the
best explanation for monetary non-neutrality.”2 Another representative, Woodford
(2003), says: “... taking account of delays in the adjustment of wages and prices
provides a clear justification for an approach to monetary policy that aims at price
stability.” Based on these firm beliefs, economists have been making models which
feature price stickiness to make the rigid aggregate price level and the non-neutrality
of money for the purpose of monetary policy analysis.
In this chapter, the above beliefs are challenged. Even though many economists
take price stickiness as a main factor of the non-neutrality of money, this chapter
shows that money can be almost neutral even with price stickiness. In other words,
it can be shown that the sticky price of individual firm does not always guarantee
the rigid aggregate price level. However, this is not meant to argue that money
is neutral and that monetary policy is ineffective in the real world. Money may
have the real effect as seen in various data, but what is shown here is that price
stickiness may have nothing to do with the real effect of money. This chapter aims
to demonstrate the theoretical possibility of the non-relationship between the sticky
individual price and the rigid aggregate price level. In other words, the simple model
in this chapter is suggested as an illustration for the weak position of price stickiness
as the main factor of the non-neutrality of money, not for the claim that money is
neutral.
For the purpose mentioned above, this chapter develops a model in which price
stickiness is featured and then shows that this model does not guarantee the non-
neutrality of money. The first issue is how price stickiness should be embodied into
2Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) indicate that this belief is the main factor of the so-called New
Keynesian perspective, saying: “... we should make clear that the approach we take is based on the
idea that temporary nominal price rigidities provide the key friction that gives rise to nonneutral
effects of monetary policy... For this reason, we append “New Keynesian Perspective” to the title.”
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a model. Many economists have tried to find micro evidences of price stickiness, and
most of them found that some prices often remain unchanged for some months and
that only a fraction of firms reset their prices in any given period.3 In other words,
price stickiness has been measured mainly by the infrequency of price changes, and
many economists have developed models featuring this characteristic. Taylor (1980)
and Calvo (1983), in particular, pose technical restrictions on firms’ price decisions so
that the price setting is staggered. Mankiw and Reis (2002) assume that information
is costly and disseminated slowly throughout the economy so that some firms may use
outdated information for their price settings. While these models have the frequency
of price adjustment as given exogenously,4 some other models known as menu cost
model have the pricing frequency decided endogenously assuming that firms reset
their prices only when the benefits by doing so is greater than the costs of changing
prices.5 Though the menu cost models are known to be more intuitively appealing,
the above-mentioned models have been more popular in featuring price stickiness
for their simplicity.6 Especially, among those, Calvo pricing has been the workhorse
model for its analytical tractability. Also, as for its performance, many economists
argue that it is a good approximation to a fully-specified menu cost model.7 The
popularity of the Calvo model can be seen in the fact that most central banks use it
as a basic framework for their own models for monetary policy analysis.8 In other
words, the Calvo pricing model is the most representative tool for price stickiness
and the real effect of money in most literature on monetary policy. In this sense,
this chapter uses the Calvo pricing as a basic framework for price stickiness.
3This kind of survey paper includes Bils and Klenow (2004), Angeloni et al. (2006), Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008), and Klenow and Malin (2010).
4For the reason, these models are called the time-dependent model.
5The menu cost models are also called the state-dependent model, and the examples are Caplin
and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1991), Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), Golosov and
Lucas (2007), Gertler and Leahy (2008), and Midrigan (2011).
6Recently, some papers develop models which use both the time- and state-dependent pricing
framework. See Bonomo, Carvalho, and Garcia (2010), Alvarez et al. (2011), and Demery (2012).
7See Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Midrigan (2011).
8For example, Kara (2011) indicates that the models which are used for analysing monetary
policy in the European Central Bank (ECB) are Christoffel, Coenen and Warne (2008) and Motto,
Rostagno and Christiano (2008), and the main frameworks of these two models are based on the
Calvo-type pricing mechanism.
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Then does the Calvo pricing model which features price stickiness guarantee the
real effect of money? In the standard Calvo model, a certain fraction of firms are
not allowed to change their prices while the rest reset their prices. In response to
positive monetary shock, some firms are stuck to the price level of the previous
period and the other firms raise their prices up to the new optimal level maximizing
their expected profits. In this case, due to price stickiness, the aggregate price
level does not rise enough to offset the monetary shock. This mechanism seems to
show that sticky individual price always produces rigid aggregate price and the non-
neutrality of money. However, we should note that even though the aggregate price
level is fettered by the previous price level due to price stickiness, it still depends
on the optimal prices of repricing firms. What would happen if the firms facing
the positive monetary shock set much higher prices than in the standard model?
Even in this situation, can price stickiness make the real effect of money on the
economy? As is well known, in the standard model, the optimization processes of
firms are implemented under many assumptions which are adopted for the simplicity
of the model. For example, in the standard model, it is assumed that all firms are
homogeneous and that they make rational expectations on future economic status.
What would happen if there is any breakdown of those assumptions? It may be
possible that this breakdown might make the repricing firms choose another optimal
price which is different from that of the firms in the standard Calvo model against
monetary shocks. The question is whether or not even in such case we can find a
solid causal connection between price stickiness and the non-neutrality of money.
To answer the above question, this chapter sets up a model which is the same as
the standard Calvo pricing framework, except that the repricing firms are assumed
to set different prices from the optimal price of the standard model. More precisely,
in the proposed model, firms’ reset prices are assumed to be more volatile. In other
words, the repricing firms set much higher and lower prices than the optimal price
against positive and negative monetary shocks, respectively. This is the reason why
the model is called ‘Volatile Prices Model’ in this chapter. However, the assumption
4
of volatile optimal price is very ad hoc. In other words, the model gives no expla-
nation on what makes firms set volatile prices. Therefore, it cannot be said that
the model reflects the real world very accurately. However, the main focus of this
chapter is placed on the effect of volatility of firms’ optimal prices on the role of price
stickiness in relation to the non-neutrality of money. In this sense, the discussion on
the factor which brings about the volatility of firms’ prices is put aside for the next
two chapters, and this chapter just focuses on the model only as a simple illustration
of the possibility that price stickiness does not lead to the monetary non-neutrality
in the case where firms’ optimal prices are volatile. The simple illustration in this
chapter will be augmented by more micro-founded models developed in Chapters 2
and 3.
The modified Calvo model of this chapter still features price stickiness because
some fraction of firms are not allowed to reset their prices as in the standard Calvo
framework. However, this model shows that, in spite of the sticky price, the real
effect of monetary policy is very small compared to the standard model when the
reset prices are volatile. It is shown in the model that increase in the volatility of
reset price has the effect of lowering the degree of price stickiness and increasing the
future discount factor in the standard Calvo framework. Also, this effect leads to
more flexible aggregate price level and less output response against monetary shocks.
This result means that price stickiness of individual firm which is generated by the
Calvo pricing may not always imply the non-neutrality of money.9 In other words,
even though the price of an individual firm is sticky, the aggregate price level may not
be rigid under certain circumstances like the case where the repricing firms respond
very elastically to the monetary shock as in the proposed model. That is, depending
on the volatility of the optimal price, the inflation rigidity may not be guaranteed
even if there is price stickiness among individual firms. This result implies that
9The economy in the model of this chapter is cashless as in many of the standard New Keynesian
models following Woodford (2003) in which monetary policy is performed by the direct adjustment
of nominal interest rate. In other words, money does not exist in a strict sense of the word. Rather
it is just used as a unit of account. In that sense, the term, “non-neutrality of money”, should
be understood as “the real effect of monetary policy” rather than that of the literal meaning of
“money”.
5
economists and central banks need to pay more attention to the volatility of the
reset prices when analysing the effect of monetary policy. Also, they need to try to
find another factor which can make the non-neutrality of money regardless of the
price volatility in developing monetary models.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the review
of the literature related to this chapter. Section 1.3 outlines the Calvo framework
with volatile prices and explains how it differs from the standard model. Section
1.4 describes the simple Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in
which the modified Calvo pricing framework is embodied. In section 1.5, the results
of simple simulations conducted with this model are reported, and the discussions
of the results with further issues for future research are presented. The last section
summarizes the main arguments of this chapter and draws the main conclusion.
1.2 Literature Review
As stated above, it is a common convention that price of individual firm is sticky,
and many survey papers present micro evidences of price stickiness. However, as
for the relationship between price stickiness and the non-neutrality of money, it still
remains a topic of controversy. Even though many economists, especially the New
Keynesians, believe that sticky price is the main factor which brings about the non-
neutrality of money, there are still many papers which argue that price stickiness
does not always imply the real effect of money.
Head et al. (2012) is the most representative paper which insists that money
can be neutral in spite of price stickiness. They set up the model in which money
is fully neutral and the equilibrium involves a non-degenerate price distribution
using search friction approach of Burdett and Judd (1983). Since all firms have the
same profit within a certain support of the price distribution, firms do not have to
adjust their prices so long as they remain within the support in spite of monetary
shock. Suppose that the price distribution in equilibrium is given by F (p) with
the support, F = [p, p¯]. With positive monetary shock, aggregate price (P ) goes
6
up and the price distribution shifts to the right. That is, Ft
(
=
[
p
t
, p¯t
])
shifts to
Ft+1
(
=
[
p
t+1
, p¯t+1
])
where p
t
< p
t+1
< p¯t < p¯t+1. However, because money is
neutral by construction, the distribution of real price does not change. That is, we
have the invariant F (p/P ). With this monetary shock, firms with their prices (pt)
out of the new support (Ft+1) must reset the prices. However, firms with pt ∈ Ft+1
do not have to do so. Therefore, we can observe sticky price in this framework
because some fraction of firms may not adjust their prices. However, money is
neutral because there is neither menu cost nor Calvo fairy in this model. With these
results, the authors argue that price stickiness does not imply the existence of any
real resource cost of changing prices (“menu costs”) or technological constraint (e.g.
Calvo pricing) to adjusting prices and that price stickiness has nothing to do with
the real effect of money. However, there are some criticisms on these arguments.
Kryvtsov (2010) points out that the meaning of price stickiness in Head et al. (2012)
is somewhat different from what is commonly used.10 It is commonly accepted that
price becomes sticky because adjusting prices always cause decrease in profit due to
the so-called menu cost. That is, price stickiness is attributed to the fact that firms
are not free in changing prices. However, in Head et al. (2012), firms are absolutely
free to adjust prices. The reason why firms do not change prices is because they do
not have to do so, not because they cannot do so. In other words, sticky price is
not an inevitable consequence of menu costs, but the result of a firm’s discretionary
choice.11 Kryvtsov (2010) also argues that the model of Head et al. (2012) cannot
predict individual price behaviour. Since each firm has the same profit within a
certain support of price distribution, the individual price after a shock cannot be
predicted without any assumption on a policy function which shows how each firm
sets its own price.
Golosov and Lucas (2007) is another paper which shows that price stickiness does
10The paper Kryvtsov (2010) discussed is the previous version of Head et al. (2012), “Equilibrium
Price Dispersion and Rigidity: A New Monetarist Approach” (Head et al., 2010).
11Similarly, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) say that the neutrality of money in the model of
Head et al. (2012) is because sticky prices are not costly. However, they show that menu costs
are the main factor of price stickiness using the data on stock market returns supporting the New
Keynesian interpretation of price stickiness.
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not guarantee the non-neutrality of money. Unlike Head et al. (2012), in order to
produce price stickiness, they develop the state-dependent menu cost model in which
firms face a fixed cost for changing prices. However, they demonstrate that money
is approximately neutral in spite of price stickiness across individual firms when
there are idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as aggregate monetary shocks.
This result is based on the “selection effect” which means repricing firms are not
selected at random but are those whose prices are furthest from the optimal reset
price level. Suppose that a positive monetary shock is applied. Then the relative
price distribution which is generated by the idiosyncratic productivity shock shifts
to the left, and more firms in the left-hand tail of the distribution will feel the
need for increasing prices. However, because the positive monetary shock offsets the
negative idiosyncratic shocks at the same time, the firms in the right-hand tail that
would otherwise have decreased prices will not change their prices. Hence, most
price adjustments in this economy are taken by the firms in the left-hand tail, and
therefore, the aggregate price goes up quickly with these large positive adjustments.
As a result, under the menu cost framework with idiosyncratic productivity shock,
price stickiness does not imply the real effect of money. However, Golosov and Lucas
(2007) are criticized for the inconsistency with micro evidences on the size of price
changes. In the menu cost framework, firms change their prices only when doing so
gives more profit than the costs, and therefore, we cannot see the small price changes
in this model. But the micro data shows that high fraction of price changes are very
small.12 Midrigan (2011) also argues that the standard deviation of the size of price
changes in absolute value in the Golosov and Lucas (1.2%) is too small compared
to the data (8.2%). It is shown in numerous literature that the non-neutrality of
money can be obtained when the wide dispersion of price changes are featured in
the menu cost model.13
As can be seen above, although some papers argue that observation of sticky
12For example, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) analyse that 44.3% of price changes are distributed
within 5% in absolute value.
13See Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and Midrigan (2011).
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price in the micro data does not imply the non-neutrality of money, there are still
lots of criticism on these papers. Therefore, the conventional view still seems to
be that price stickiness is the main factor that brings about the non-neutrality
of money and the real effect of monetary policy. In addition, the most popular
framework which represents this conventional thought is the Calvo pricing model
which is most widely used among economists and central banks for the purpose of
monetary policy analysis. Moreover, within the scope of what we have researched,
though some literature makes issues of its performance and inconsistency with micro
data, there is no paper which brings the Calvo framework’s ability to produce the
non-neutrality of money into question. Therefore, this chapter would be the first to
bring attention to the relationship of the Calvo pricing, price stickiness generated
by the Calvo framework, and the non-neutrality of money.
1.3 Calvo Framework with Volatile Prices
Under the standard Calvo pricing framework, each firm adjusts its price by maxi-
mizing the present discounted value of expected profits as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+sPt+s
(
pit
Pt+s
−mct+s
)
yit+s,
where θ is the probability of not changing prices, Qt,t+s is the stochastic discount
factor, Pt is the aggregate price level, pit is the individual price of firm i, mct is the
marginal cost, and yit is the output demand which firm i faces. Given the demand
curve, yit = (Pit/Pt)
−yt, we have
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+sPt+s
[(
pit
Pt+s
)1−
−mct+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−]
yt+s,
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where  is the price elasticity of demand and yt is the aggregate output. The first
order condition with respect to pit is given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−
yt+s
[
1− 
− 1mct+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−1]
= 0. (1.1)
Therefore, firm i chooses pit satisfying (1.1) when it receives the Calvo signal. Since
all firms that receive the signal at time t face the same optimization problem, each
firm changing its price chooses the same optimal price denoted by p∗t . Then we have
the following dynamics of the aggregate price level.
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)(p∗t )1−. (1.2)
Facing the monetary expansion, mt = αmt−1(α > 1), (1−θ) fraction of firms choose
p∗t > pit−1. However, since θ fraction of firms are stuck to pit−1 (price stickiness), the
aggregate price level does not fully go up (Pt < αPt−1), and therefore, the aggregate
output increases (yt > yt−1). This is the mechanism by which the Calvo pricing
produces the non-neutrality of money.
However, as mentioned above, not all economists agree to the relationship be-
tween price stickiness and non-neutrality of money. For example, Head et al. (2012)
show that individual price can be sticky even if firms are free to adjust prices and
aggregate price is flexible. In other words, they demonstrate the non-relationship
between the sticky price and the rigidity of aggregate price level. Then what drives
them to the different interpretation on price stickiness? Gorodnichenko and Weber
(2013) indicate that sticky price is not costly in the model of Head et al. (2012),
which is not the case in other New Keynesian models, and this difference leads to
the opposing result. However, we attribute the result to the difference of volatility
in optimal price rather than the cost of sticky price between the two kinds of models.
In other words, the reset prices in Head et al. (2012) are much more volatile than
those in the standard Calvo model. According to the result of quantitative exercise
in the model of Head et al. (2012), average absolute value of price changes is 9%
10
with the inflation rate of 3% and the possibility of not changing price around 0.9.
However, in the standard Calvo model, the optimal price changes by less than 1%
under a similar condition.14 Then can we get the fully neutral money as in Head et
al. (2012) if we set more volatile optimal prices even under the Calvo framework?
We can find a clue from the dynamics of the aggregate price level. As can be seen
in (1.2), Pt is fettered by Pt−1 due to price stickiness. However, we focus on the fact
that Pt still depends on p
∗
t . We can anticipate that the volatility of p
∗
t will affect that
of Pt in any way, and therefore, the degree of non-neutrality of money will change.
For the purpose of verification of the above conjecture, we develop the ‘Volatile
Prices’ model in which the optimal price, p∗t , is very volatile. In the standard Calvo
model, p∗t is obtained under the assumption that repricing firms behave rationally
with full information in pricing. However, in the real economy, firms do not always
show rational behaviours, and information is usually imperfect. In this sense, we
suppose that firms, for whatever reason, set more volatile prices than the optimal
price, p∗t . More precisely, we assume that repricing firms set higher and lower prices
than p∗t against positive and negative monetary shocks, respectively. In this case, we
can expect that the volatility of individual firms’ prices makes the aggregate price
level more flexible than that in the standard model. With the ‘Volatile Prices’ model,
we can check whether the expectation is correct and the Calvo pricing can guarantee
the non-neutrality of money even under the volatile reset prices of individual firms.
1.4 Model
The framework used in this chapter is the standard simple New Keynesian model
based on Calvo (1983), except that firms set a volatile price rather than an optimally
driven price.
14We firstly set the size of monetary shock so that the annual inflation rate would be around 3%
under the flexible economy (θ=0), and then simulate the model with θ = 0.9.
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1.4.1 Firms
There is a continuum of firms i ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm hires labour, hit, and produces
its own goods, yit, through the production technology which takes form
yit = hit.
Each firm i sets its price by optimizing its decision-making through minimizing costs
of production and maximizing its expected profit with the production. The cost
minimization is the same as in the standard model as in Appendix 1.A. However,
the profit maximization shows that the reset price of firm i is more volatile than the
optimal price of the standard model as shown in the following.
Profit Maximization
As in the standard mechanism of Calvo framework, a fraction θ of firms are not
allowed to change their prices at time t. The remaining fraction (1 − θ) of firms
reset their prices, pit. Since all firms which receive Calvo signal at time t face the
same decision problem of profit maximization, each repricing firm sets the same
price that we denote by pvt . Therefore, using the definition of the aggregate price
index
(
P 1−t =
∫ 1
0 (pit)
1− di
)
,15 we have the following dynamics of the aggregate
price level,
P 1−t =
∫
ωt
P 1−it−1di+ (1− θ)(pvt )1− = θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ)(pvt )1−, (1.3)
where ωt is the set of firms which are not allowed to change their prices at time t.
In our framework, the repricing firms are assumed to set more volatile prices (pvt )
than the optimal prices (p∗t ) in the standard Calvo pricing model. More precisely,
the volatile price is assumed to be given by
pvt = α(p
∗
t − Pt) + Pt,
15See Appendix 1.B for the derivation.
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where α > 1 is the coefficient which displays a degree of volatility of individual firm’s
price.16 Dividing both sides of the equation by Pt, we can have
p˜vt = αp˜t + (1− α) (1.4)
as an equivalence relation, where p˜vt (= p
v
t /Pt) and p˜t(= p
∗
t /Pt) denote the relative
value of volatile and optimal price, respectively. The optimal price, p∗t , can be
obtained by satisfying the first order condition of firms’ profit maximization problems
as in equation (1.1) which can be rearranged as
p˜t =

− 1
f1t
f2t
, (1.5)
where
f1t = λtytmct + βθEt(pit+1)
f1t+1 (1.6)
f2t = λtyt + βθEt(pit+1)
−1f2t+1, (1.7)
and pit(= Pt/Pt−1) denotes the gross inflation rate.
As mentioned above, the assumption of volatile optimal price is very ad hoc
without any micro-foundation. In other words, this model gives no explanation as
to why the firms set such volatile prices. Therefore, it cannot be said that the model
with this assumption is fit for purpose for reflecting the real economy. However,
considering the main interest of this chapter which is the investigation on how the
relationship between price stickiness and the non-neutrality of money is affected by
the volatility of firms’ reset prices, the model should be understood only as a tool for
the simulation of the effect of volatile reset price on the economy. Therefore, we can
take the above assumption as the simplest and most efficient method for enabling
the model to illustrate how the volatility of reset price functions on the real effect
of money when firms face price stickiness.17
16We can easily find that pvt is nothing but p
∗
t when α is equal to one.
17The missing part of the assumption, which is about how and why the firms’ prices are so
volatile, will be made up for by more micro-founded models in the next two chapters.
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1.4.2 Rest of the Model
The optimization problems of households, the policy of monetary authority, and
the market clearing conditions are the same as those in the standard model (see
Appendix 1.B). The representative household chooses the aggregate consumption
(ct), the amount of hours of labour supply (ht), and the real bond holding (bt)
by minimizing expenditure and maximizing utility. The monetary authority sets
interest rate (Rt) by following the simple standard rule against monetary shock (νt)
and all the markets are assumed to be cleared.
The conditions for equilibrium, the steady state, the log-linearized form, and the
calibration of the model are described in Appendix 1.C.
1.5 Simulation Results
1.5.1 Impulse Responses
We simulate the model and compare it to the benchmark model which is the stan-
dard Calvo model with the same parameters.18 The impulse responses of the main
variables of the two models are given as in Figure 1.1. In this simulation, the degree
of volatility (α) is set to a purely arbitrary value of 1.2. The simulation result shows
that the ‘Volatile Prices’ model produces bigger inflation response and smaller out-
put response to the expansionary money shocks than the benchmark model. This
means that the real effect of money on the economy is much lessened with volatile
reset prices. In our model, since the repricing firms set higher prices than that of
the standard model against positive monetary shocks, we can easily expect that the
aggregate price level will be also higher than that of the benchmark model. Due to
this highly elevated price level, the aggregate output response is not so high. This
result demonstrates that even though the price of an individual firm is sticky, the
aggregate price level may not be so rigid if the repricing firms adjust their prices
fully enough to absorb the shocks for whatever reason.
18Dynare with Matlab is used for the simulation.
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Response Functions to the Monetary Shocks
1.5.2 Pricing Volatility and Price Stickiness
Overall, above impulse responses of the ‘Volatile Prices’ model resemble those of the
standard Calvo model with lower level of θ. In this sense, we need to check what the
meaning of the volatility of our model (α) is with respect to its relationship with the
degree of price stickiness (θ) in the standard model. Firstly, from the log-linearized
forms of (1.3)∼(1.7),19 we can get the following NKPC (New Keynesian Phillips
Curve).
pˆit =
α(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
mˆct + β {α+ (1− α)θ}Etpˆit+1 (1.8)
19See Appendix 1.C
15
Then we can re-express this NKPC as a standard form of NKPC using new variables
of β˜ and θ˜ as follows.
pˆit =
(1− β˜θ˜)(1− θ˜)
θ˜
mˆct + β˜Etpˆit+1, (1.9)
where
(1− β˜θ˜)(1− θ˜)
θ˜
=
α(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
(1.10)
and
β˜ = β {α+ (1− α)θ} . (1.11)
We can interpret this standard NKPC to show the supply side of an economy in
which a discount factor of household is given by β˜ and a degree of price stickiness
firms face is expressed by θ˜. Putting (1.11) into (1.10), we can get the expression
for θ˜ with α and θ as
θ˜ =
θ
α+ θ − αθ . (1.12)
From (1.12), we have
∆θ˜
∆α
= − θ(1− θ)
(α+ θ − αθ)2 < 0, (1.13)
which means that θ˜ decreases as α increases.20 In other words, increased volatility
in the model has the meaning of decrease in stickiness of individual firms’ prices in
the standard Calvo framework.
1.5.3 Sticky Individual Price and Rigid Aggregate Price
The above negative relationship between α and θ˜ can also be confirmed in the
following result of recalibration exercise as shown in Figure 1.2. In this exercise, the
degree of price stickiness of the standard model (θs) is recalibrated to a lower level
in order to get the same impulse responses as of the ‘Volatile Prices’ model. When
20Actually, we have another solution for the equations of (1.10) and (1.11) which is θ˜ = 1/(βθ).
However, it is discarded with the consideration that θ˜ can be regarded as the probability of not
changing prices in the standard form of NKPC, (1.9), and therefore, it should be between zero and
one.
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⇒< θv = θs = 2/3 > < θv = 2/3, θs = 0.51984 >
Figure 1.2: Recalibration Exercise
we lower θs from 2/3 which is very standard in the literature to 0.51984, we can get
the same inflation and output responses as of the ‘Volatile Prices’ model with the
degree of price stickiness (θv) fixed to 2/3 and the degree of volatility (α) of 1.2.
As stated above, the result of this exercise shows that the proposed model can be
regarded as another standard Calvo model which has a much lower θ. However, the
more interesting and important meaning of this result is that we can get some hints
on the relationship between the sticky individual price and the rigid aggregate price.
As can be seen on the right panel of Figure 1.2, we set different θ with two models
but we get the same inflation response. The probability of not changing price which
is denoted by θ deals with the degree of price stickiness, and the inflation response
shows the rigidity of aggregate price. Therefore, we can say that with different price
stickiness we can get the same rigidity of aggregate price. This result makes us
cast doubt on the relationship between price stickiness of individual firms and the
rigidity of aggregate price level. We can guess that these two things may not be
related, and therefore, price stickiness may not bring about the non-neutrality of
17
Figure 1.3: Neutral Money with Positive Value of θ
money. These hypotheses are supported by the next simulation result as in Figure
1.3. In this simulation, we set θ equal to be 2/3 for both the models but give more
volatility by setting α to be 1.367 rather than 1.2 for the ‘Volatile Prices’ model.
As can be seen, the model shows fully neutral money. That is, in this model, a
small fraction of repricing firms raise their prices fully enough to absorb the whole
monetary shocks. As is well known, in the standard Calvo model, we should set θ to
be zero in order to get fully neutral money. However, in the proposed model, even
with a very positive value of θ, that is even with very considerable degree of price
stickiness, money has no real effect. Therefore, with this result, we can say that
price stickiness does not always guarantee the non-neutrality of money.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses with Different Value of α
1.5.4 Pricing Volatility and Discount Factor
As mentioned above, in the ‘Volatile Prices’ model, the main factor which leads to
the above disconnection between price stickiness and the aggregate price rigidity
is the assumption that repricing firms set more volatile prices than those in the
standard Calvo model. It is also shown that increased volatility of pricing by this
assumption has the effect of decreasing the degree of price stickiness in the standard
Calvo framework. However, the result as shown in Figure 1.3 suggests that there
is another factor which brings about the above result. If the only effect that the
assumption of the volatile prices has in the proposed model is just to lower the degree
of price stickiness, then it is expected that the economy expressed by the NKPC as
in (1.9) should have no price stickiness. In other words, θ˜ in equation (1.12) should
be zero with α of 1.367. However, θ˜ is calculated at 0.594 with the value of α.
Impulse response as shown in Figure 1.4 is another evidence that the effect of
lowering θ˜ is not everything. Figure 1.4 shows the responses of inflation and output
in the first period after positive monetary shock with different levels of α.21 In
21As is well known, the responses of main variables in the standard framework are expressed as
increasing or decreasing linear functions of their own values in the previous period. In other words,
the response function of xˆt in equilibrium is given by
xˆt = ρxˆt−1,
where ρ is the persistence parameter of the monetary shocks. The model in this chapter shows the
same dynamics of responses. Therefore, even though the numerical differences will change, it is
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particular, with α above 1.367, it can be verified that the real effect of money
occurs in the opposite direction. That is, with the expansionary money shock and
the resulting price increase, the aggregate output drops down, which is beyond our
common sense. This eccentric result is due to inflation rising up higher than the level
where the effect of shocks are fully absorbed as the degree of volatility in repricing
firm’s pricing, α, becomes extremely big, and therefore, the effect of rising prices
of the firms overwhelms the economy. In the standard Calvo framework, this result
cannot be obtained by only lowering the degree of individual price stickiness. Then
what is the factor which makes this result possible? It can be found in equation
(1.11) which shows the functional relationship between β˜ and α. From this, we have
∆β˜
∆α
= β(1− θ) > 0, (1.14)
which means that β˜ increases as α gets larger. This is another effect that increasing
α brings about besides lowering θ˜. In other words, increasing volatility in individual
firm’s pricing has the effect of not only decreasing the degree of price stickiness but
also increasing the discount factor in the standard Calvo model. Generally speaking,
the bigger the discount factor is, the more weight economic agents put on the future
profits. Therefore, within the standard Calvo framework, repricing firms with a
high value of discount factor are very much concerned about the possibility of not
changing prices next period and, consequently, losing profits. Therefore, firms set
very high prices even with very small amount of expansionary money shocks.
Figure 1.5 shows that this effect on β˜ is greater than that on θ˜ in achieving much
higher inflation response against positive money shock. In the figure, we can find
that the inflation responses in the first period after the shock are plotted in
(
θ˜, β˜
)
space. Firstly, the dotted line is for the ‘Volatile Prices’ model with different value
of α. In other words, the dotted line shows the sets of the size of inflation responses,
expected that the characteristic differences of the responses in the first period after shocks between
the models will continue until the shocks finally disappear. In that sense, we can grasp the whole
picture of dynamics even just through the first period after the shock.
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β˜
θ˜
Figure 1.5: Inflation Response with Different Value of β˜ and θ˜
β˜, and θ˜, which are corresponding to the value of α between 1 to 1.367.22 We can
easily find that as α increases, inflation response gets larger with β˜ increasing and θ˜
decreasing. The three-dimensional shape with a curved surface in this figure is for
the standard Calvo model with the form of NKPC as in (1.9). The surface shows
all the levels of inflation responses which can be obtained with every possible sets of
β˜ and θ˜. As can be seen, decreasing θ˜ and increasing β˜ bring about the increase of
inflation responses.23 However, this figure shows that the major driving force behind
the rising level of inflation response in the ‘Volatile Prices’ model is the increase of
β˜ rather than the decrease of θ˜. As summarized in Table 1.1, β˜ increases from 0.99
to 10/9 and θ˜ decreases from 2/3 to 0.594 as α increases from 1 to 1.367 with β
equal to be 0.99 and θ equal to be 2/3. These movements raise the level of inflation
22The value of α is limited to the range between 1 and 1.367 because the minimum value of α is
one by construction and the values over 1.367 brings about the real effect in the opposite direction
which is beyond our interest.
23However, the effect of decreasing θ˜, given the value of β˜, is not positive any more in raising
the level of inflation responses when α (or β˜) is greater than 1.367 (or 10/9). Even though the
decrease of θ˜ in the economy expressed by the NKPC of (1.9) means that more firms can adjust
their prices, and therefore, the aggregate price level rises even higher, we should note that there is
another meaning that the probability of not changing prices next period is decreasing. With the
range of high β˜, the repricing firms in this economy of (1.9) take much account of future profit and,
therefore, worry about the possibility of not changing prices next period which would bring about
the loss of profit as stated above. However, in this case, decreasing θ˜ lowers the possibility of not
changing prices, offsetting the effect of β˜. Even though this offsetting effect is very small with a
low value of β˜, it becomes much larger as β˜ increases.
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β˜θ˜
2/3 (α = 1) −→ 0.594 (α = 1.367)
0.99 (α = 1) 0.0149 −→ 0.0155
 (↓ ↓ ↓
10/9 (α = 1.367) 0.0167 −→ 0.0167
Table 1.1: Size of Inflation Response with Different Values of β˜ and θ˜
response from 0.0149 to 0.0167. However, while the increase of β˜ could raise the
response to the maximum level even if there would have been no movement of θ˜,
the decrease of θ˜ could raise the response only to the level of 0.0155 without any
changes in β˜. Therefore, it can be concluded that most of the increase in inflation
response in the model is due to the increase of β˜.
1.5.5 Limitations
The above results show that volatile reset price can make even neutral money
through the decrease of θ˜ and the increase of β˜. However, as mentioned before,
this model is not for the reflection of the real world but for a simple illustration of
the theoretical possibility of non-relationship between price stickiness and the real
effect of money. Therefore, we cannot say the above result demonstrates that money
can be neutral in the real world. However, we can claim that monetary policy can
be less powerful than we expect when firms’ reset prices are very volatile and that
price stickiness may not be a sufficient condition for the non-neutrality of money.
Also, for the purpose of simplicity, this model leaves out some important fac-
tors to be considered. Firstly, the monetary authority in this model is assumed to
implement the same policy rule as in the standard model. However, we can easily
expect that the monetary policy will vary with different structure of economy. Sec-
ondly, this model does not say anything about the change in welfare of the economy
when firms’ reset prices are very volatile. As shown in the model equations above,
firm’s reset price (pvt ) deviates from the optimal level (p
∗
t ) in terms of firm’s profit
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maximization. Therefore, welfare in the economy might be worsened by the higher
volatility of the reset price compared to that of the standard model. Finally, as men-
tioned several times above, the model in this chapter does not explain what causes
such volatility in firms’ reset prices. Any change or relaxation of the strict assump-
tions in the standard model might be able to bring about the volatility. Colluding
firms or boundedly rational pricing behaviours as in the frameworks proposed in the
next two chapters would be one of the examples.
Therefore, all the simulation results of this model should be understood with
the consideration of the limitations above, and future research should be focused on
solving those limitations.
1.6 Conclusion
The simple Calvo model with volatile prices of individual firms shows that it is
possible to have very small amount of real effect of money or fully neutral money in
spite of the fact that there exists price stickiness in the pricing behaviour of individual
firms. In this ‘Volatile Prices’ model, the volatility of reset price has the same effect
as that of lowering the degree of price stickiness and increasing the future discount
factor in the standard Calvo framework. This effect makes the aggregate price level
much more flexible than the standard model, and therefore, price stickiness cannot
fully generate the non-neutrality of money. There are two implications from the
results. Firstly, the model shows that there is a need to pay more attention to the
repricing firms and the volatility of their prices when analysing monetary policy.
Price stickiness featured by the Calvo mechanism mainly focuses on the firms which
cannot adjust prices and does not say much about the volatility of the reset price.
However, the results of the model in this chapter demonstrate that the effect of
unadjusted prices can be cancelled out by the volatile movements of the adjusted
prices. The second implication which is more important can be obtained from the
fact that the result of the model challenges the conventional view that the main
factor which produces the non-neutrality of money is price stickiness. According to
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the results, money can be neutral even though the price of individual firm is sticky
under certain circumstances like the case where the repricing firms respond very
elastically to the monetary shocks as in the proposed model. Is it possible to give a
categorical assurance that the reset price in the real world is not more volatile than
the standard Calvo model suggests? If it is not, it is clear that the Calvo-type price
stickiness is not sufficient in producing the non-neutrality of money. Also, we need to
note that what is important for the non-neutrality of money is the stickiness of the
aggregate price level itself rather than that of the individual price. In other words,
neither searching micro evidences on the stickiness of individual prices nor modelling
such stickiness is sufficient to argue that monetary policy has the real effect on the
economy. Instead, effort should be made to find out which other factors make the
aggregate price level sticky and to make models which feature such factors.
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Appendix 1.A
Taking the real wage as given, firm i hires an optimal level of labour by minimizing
the production costs as
min
hit
Wt
Pt
hit s.t. yit = hit,
where Wt is the nominal wage. The first order condition with respect to hit yields
γt =
Wt
Pt
,
where γt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Since γt means the additional real cost of
producing an extra unit, we can interpret γt as the real marginal cost, mct, as
mct =
Wt
Pt
= wt, (1.15)
where wt denotes the real wage.
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Appendix 1.B
Households
It is assumed that there are a large number of infinitely-lived households of measure
1. The representative household maximizes the expected present value of utility by
choosing the aggregate consumption (ct), the amount of hours of labour supply (ht),
and the bond holding (Bt). This utility maximization problem is given by
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
c1−σt+k − 1
1− σ −
h1+%t+k
1 + %
)
s.t.
∫ 1
0
pitcitdi+QtBt = Bt−1 +Wtht + Φt,
where β is the discount factor, σ is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution, % is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, pit is the price
of differentiated good of firm i, cit is a consumption of differentiated goods of firm
i, Qt is the price of bonds, Wt is the nominal wage, and Φt is the nominal dividends
from firms.
(Expenditure Minimization)
The aggregate consumption, ct, is defined as
ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
−1

it di
) 
−1
, (1.16)
where  > 1 is the price elasticity of demand. Given any level of aggregate consump-
tion, ct, each household minimizes consumption expenditure as
min
cit
∫ 1
0
pitcitdi s.t. ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
−1

it di
) 
−1
.
Then the first order condition with respect to cit gives
pit − µt
[(∫ 1
0
c
−1

it di
) 1
−1
c
−1/
it
]
= 0, (1.17)
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where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Using (1.16), we can simplify this into
cit = ct
(
pit
µt
)−
. (1.18)
Putting this into (1.16), we get
µt =
[∫ 1
0
(pit)
1− di
] 1
1−
. (1.19)
Since the Lagrangian multiplier (µt) is the marginal cost needed for getting one unit
of the aggregate consumption (ct), µt can be interpreted as the aggregate price index
(Pt) as
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
(pit)
1− di
] 1
1−
. (1.20)
Then, from (1.18) and (1.20), we have the demand for each differentiated good as
cit = ct
(
pit
Pt
)−
. (1.21)
(Utility Maximization)
Using (1.20) and (1.21), the utility maximization problem of the representative
household can be re-expressed by
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
c1−σt+k − 1
1− σ −
h1+%t+k
1 + %
)
s.t. ct +Qtbt =
bt−1Pt−1
Pt
+
Wt
Pt
ht + φt,
where bt(= Bt/Pt) is the real bond and φt(= Φt/Pt) is the real profit. The first
order conditions with respect to ct, bt, and ht are respectively given by
c−σt = λt (1.22)
Qt = βEt
(
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1
λt
)
(1.23)
λt
Wt
Pt
= λtwt = h
%
t , (1.24)
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where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier and wt (= Wt/Pt) denotes real wage at time t.
Equation (1.22) is the marginal utility of consumption, equation (1.23) is the Euler
equation which shows the condition for consumption optimality, and equation (1.24)
represents the optimality condition for labour supply.
Monetary Authority
The central bank as the monetary authority is assumed to implement monetary
policy by following the simple interest rate rule.
Rt
R
=
(pit
pi
)ηpi (yt
y
)ηy
(νt)
−1 , (1.25)
where Rt is the gross interest rate which is the same as the inverse of the bond price
(Rt = 1/Qt) , and νt is the monetary policy shock which follows
24
νt
ν
=
(νt−1
ν
)ρ
exp(et), et ∼ N(0, ς), (1.26)
where ρ is the persistence parameter of the shocks. The coefficients, ηpi and ηy, show
the degree of responsiveness of the monetary authority on inflation and aggregate,
respectively.
Market Clearing
Firstly, the demand for each good (cit) should be equal to supply (yit) so that we
have cit = yit. Let the aggregate output (yt) be defined as yt =
(∫ 1
0 y
−1

it di
) 
−1
.
Then the market clearing condition in the goods market is given by
yt = ct. (1.27)
The labour market clears with the following condition.
∫ 1
0
hitdi = ht.
24Note that from (1.25), the positive value of νt means the expansionary monetary policy shocks.
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From the demand function (1.21) and goods market’s clearing condition (1.27), we
have
yit = yt
(
pit
Pt
)−
.
Since firm’s production technology is given by yit = hit, we have
hit = yt
(
pit
Pt
)−
.
Integrating both sides of the equation, we can get
ht = ytst,
where st
(
=
∫ 1
0
(
pit
Pt
)−
di
)
is a measure of price dispersion. Since st is equal to one
up to a first order approximation, the market clearing condition becomes
ht = yt. (1.28)
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Appendix 1.C
Equilibrium
Equilibrium of this model can be obtained when all the endogenous variables, which
are the stationary processes of ct, λt, ht, wt, yt, Rt, pit, mct, p˜
v
t , p˜t, f1t, f2t, and the
exogenous variable, which is the stochastic process of {νt}∞t=0, satisfy the equations
of (1.3)∼(1.7), (1.15) and (1.22)∼(1.28).
Steady State
The steady states of variables which are calculated by removing the time subscripts
from the above equations are presented in Table 1.2.
Variable Steady State
pi, ν, p˜v, p˜ 1
R 1/β
mc (− 1)/
y mc
1
σ+%
h, c y
λ c−σ
w mc
f1 λymc/(1− βθ)
f2 λy/(1− βθ)
Table 1.2: Steady State Values of Variables of Volatile Prices Model
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Log-linearization
All the equations of (1.3)∼(1.7), (1.15) and (1.22)∼(1.28), which are needed for the
equilibrium, are log-linearized as
ˆ˜pvt =
θ
1− θ pˆit (1.29)
ˆ˜pvt =α ˆ˜pt (1.30)
ˆ˜pt =fˆ1t − fˆ2t (1.31)
fˆ1t =(1− βθ)
(
λˆt + yˆt + mˆct
)
+ βθEt
[
pˆit+1 + fˆ1t+1
]
(1.32)
fˆ2t =(1− βθ)
(
λˆt + yˆt
)
+ βθEt
[
(− 1)pˆit+1 + fˆ2t+1
]
(1.33)
mˆct =wˆt (1.34)
λˆt =− σcˆt (1.35)
λˆt =Et
[
λˆt+1
]
− Et [pˆit+1] + Rˆt (1.36)
%hˆt =λˆt + wˆt (1.37)
Rˆt =ηpipˆit + ηyyˆt + νˆt (1.38)
νˆt =ρνˆt−1 + et (1.39)
yˆt =cˆt (1.40)
yˆt =hˆt. (1.41)
Calibration
The parameters used in this model are calibrated following the standard assumptions
in the literature. Basically, the frequency in the model is assumed to be quarterly.
With this assumption on the frequency, the constant discount factor, β, is set to be
0.99 following the fact that the average nominal annual interest rate in the US is
around 4%. The inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is set to
be 1 following the literature. The measure of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply, %, is also set to be 1 as in numerous literature. The price elasticity of
demand, , is set to be 11 to match the data that average mark-ups are around 10%
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in the steady state. Also, the Calvo parameter, θ, is set to be 2/3 to match the micro
data that firms re-set their prices once every three quarters on average. Following
Taylor (1993), the coefficients on inflation and output, ηpi and ηy, are set to be 1.5
and 0.125, respectively.25 Lastly, the persistence parameter of the monetary shocks,
ρ, is set to be 0.9.
25Taylor (1993) estimates ηy as 0.5 under the annual frequency. In this chapter, since the model
is based on the quarterly frequency, a quarter of 0.5 (=0.125) is used instead.
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Chapter 2
Colluding Firms with Price
Stickiness and the
Non-neutrality of Money
2.1 Introduction
Many economists and central banks believe that money is non-neutral at least in
the short-run. That is, they believe that monetary policy of central bank or any
monetary shocks can make significant changes on the real economy. The belief
seems to be supported by many evidences showing that monetary shocks are not
followed by the quick response of aggregate price and, therefore, give rise to the
change of aggregate output.1 Then what makes the non-neutrality of money? Many
economists supporting the above belief seem to attribute the real effect of money to
firm’s price stickiness. Ball and Mankiw (1994) regard price stickiness as the best
answer for the non-neutrality of money, and Woodford (2003) claims that monetary
policy for stabilization of an economy is justified by the sluggish adjustment of price.
Such beliefs have made the economists and central banks establish models for the
monetary policy analysis with the micro-foundation of price stickiness by giving
1Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) is the representative example showing the evidence
of the non-neutrality of money.
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restrictions on firm’s pricing either exogenously as in Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983),
and Mankiw and Reis (2002), or endogenously as in many menu cost models.2 In
particular, the Calvo framework has been the most popular for its simplicity and
tractability, and therefore, the majority of monetary models of central banks are
based on the Calvo mechanism.3
The phenomenon of sticky price is easily observed in the real economy in the
sense that we can find many firms whose prices are not changed for a period of
time. Furthermore, there are many survey papers providing micro evidences of the
phenomenon such as Bils and Klenow (2004), Angeloni et al. (2006), Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008), and Klenow and Malin (2010). However, there seems to be a lack
of consensus on whether such price stickiness can always lead to the non-neutrality of
money. Many different opinions are addressed and discussed, but the discussion has
been restricted to only some frameworks of price stickiness such as menu cost model,
e.g., in Midrigan (2011). As for the Calvo framework which is the most popular tool
for price stickiness, the relationship between price stickiness and the real effect of
money has rarely been questioned. The aim of this chapter is to examine whether
price stickiness featured by the Calvo framework can always give rise to the non-
neutrality of money. In association with Chapter 1 which shows that the volatility
of optimal price can weaken the ability of price stickiness to produce the real effect
of money, this chapter presents more micro-founded endogenous mechanism for the
volatile optimal price and checks whether the result of Chapter 1 is augmented with
the mechanism. In particular, this chapter investigates how different treatments of
information on aggregate price affect firms’ pricings and inflation response. In the
standard Calvo model, in response to a positive monetary shock, some firms are
stuck to the price level of the previous period and other firms raise their prices up
to the new optimal level maximizing their expected profits. However, due to price
2Examples of the menu cost models include Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel
(1991), Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Gertler and Leahy (2008)
and Midrigan (2011).
3For example, as Kara (2011) indicates, the models of Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne (2008)
and Motto, Rostagno, and Christiano (2008), which are the main tools for monetary policy analysis
of the European Central Bank (ECB), are based on the Calvo system.
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stickiness, the aggregate price level does not rise enough to offset the monetary shock.
This chapter focuses on the optimization processes of the firms which are allowed
to change their prices under this framework. In the standard model, the processes
are implemented under the assumption that the aggregate price level is just given
and that each firm treats it as an exogenous factor when choosing its optimal price.
However, as explained in Section 2.2, the aggregate price level comes to contain the
information on the link between each firm’s optimal price and the aggregate price
level as long as the optimal price is the same for all firms. In other words, so long as
the homogeneous firms treat the level of aggregate price in the same way, and thus,
their optimal prices are the same, the aggregate price level can be expressed by a
function of the optimal price. This means that the level of aggregate price cannot
be an exogenous variable anymore in each firm’s price adjustment. Therefore, each
firm might have enough incentive to use the information of aggregate price level
when adjusting its price, though the condition should be met that all repricing firms
use the information equally. What would happen if firms behave as in “collusion”
so as to take the aggregate price level as a function of their optimal prices? If firms
recognize that their choices of optimal prices can affect the aggregate price level
and know the relationship between the optimal price and the aggregate price level
exactly, we can expect that the new optimal prices of the “colluding” firms will be
higher than those of firms in the standard Calvo model as we can anticipate that a
monopoly’s price is higher than that of a perfectly competitive market.
In order to investigate whether the link between the Calvo-style price stickiness
and the real effect of money can be firmly maintained even in the above-explained
framework of colluding firms, this chapter proposes a model which is the same as
the standard Calvo pricing framework, except that the repricing firms behave as
in collusion so as to exploit the dynamics of the aggregate price level. Since some
fraction of firms are still not allowed to reset their prices as in the standard Calvo
framework, price stickiness is still featured in this modified Calvo model. However,
it is shown that, in spite of the sticky price, the real effect of monetary policy is
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very small compared to the standard model. This is because the colluding firms
set their prices very high to achieve the monopolistic gains. This result means that
price stickiness of an individual firm which is generated by the Calvo framework
may not always imply the non-neutrality of money. Even though the price of an
individual firm is sticky, the aggregate price level may not be sticky under certain
circumstances like the case where the repricing firms respond very elastically to the
monetary shock as in the proposed model.
This chapter relates to some menu cost models which argue the neutrality of
money. Caplin and Spulber (1987) show no relationship between price stickiness
and the aggregate price level in response to monetary shocks, using an Ss framework
with an assumption of uniformly distributed prices. Golosov and Lucas (2007) also
claim that money can be approximately neutral in spite of price stickiness, when
idiosyncratic productivity shocks coexist with aggregate monetary shocks under the
menu cost framework. These two papers are very closely related to this chapter in
the sense that they cast doubt on the relationship between firm’s sticky price and the
aggregate price level. However, the biggest difference from this chapter is that they
are based on the menu cost framework under which firms reset prices only when the
benefits of changing price is greater than the menu costs. Under such framework, size
of price changes cannot be dispersed, which is not consistent with micro evidences.
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), and Midrigan (2011)
argue that even the menu cost framework can produce the non-neutrality of money
when the wide dispersion of price changes are featured in the model.
Another related paper is Head et al. (2012) which claims that sticky price can
be observable even in a flexible economy, using the approach of the New Monetarist
Economics.4 Even though they also show that price stickiness has nothing to do
with the rigidity of aggregate price, their framework is far from the New Keynesian
model, not to mention the Calvo framework. The consequence of such a different
framework is that, in Head et al. (2012), price stickiness is just an outcome of firms’
4Refer to Williamson and Wright (2010a, 2010b) for detailed explanations on the New Mone-
tarist Economics.
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discretionary choices under the circumstance where they do not have to change prices
within a certain range of price in which firms have the same profits. However, as is
well known in the Calvo framework as well as other New Keynesian models, sticky
price of individual firm is not just a firm’s decision, but an unavoidable consequence
of the costs which come with adjustment of price.5
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives an idea on firms
which behave as in collusion, and explains how they are incorporated in the Calvo
framework. Section 2.3 presents the detailed feature of the simple New Keynesian
Calvo model in which the colluding firms are embodied. Section 2.4 shows the simu-
lation results on how the colluding firms react to monetary shocks and how inflation
and output response are different from the standard model, and discusses the mean-
ing of the results with respect to the relationship between price stickiness and the
non-neutrality of money. Finally, section 2.5 summarizes the main arguments of this
chapter and concludes with further issues to be handled in future research.
2.2 Calvo Pricing of Colluding Firms
As expressed in Chapter 1, in the standard Calvo model, the dynamics of the ag-
gregate price level (Pt) is given by
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)(p∗t )1−, (2.1)
where  is the price elasticity of demand, θ is the probability with which firms cannot
change their prices, and p∗t denotes the average of each firm i’s optimal price (pit)
which is defined by
(p∗t )
1− =
∫
p1−it di, i ∈ (1− θ). (2.2)
5See Kryvtsov (2010) and Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) for the discussion on the meaning
of price stickiness in Head et al. (2012).
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If there is no heterogeneity among firms such as idiosyncratic shocks, all firms will
have the same optimization problem, and therefore, the optimal prices of all repricing
firms should be the same. In other words, we have to have
pit = p
∗
t (2.3)
for all i ∈ (1− θ). Hence, for each firm i, the dynamics of the aggregate price level
can be given as in
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)p1−it . (2.4)
Since, in the standard model, all firms are assumed to have perfect information on
the economy, we can interpret that firm i has already the information of (2.4) which
shows the relationship between the aggregate price level and its own optimal price at
the moment of price setting. This means the firm knows that Pt is the endogenous
variable which is affected by its optimal price, pit. Therefore, the equation (2.4)
should be one of the main considerations in the optimization process of the firm.
However, firms do not use this information in deriving their optimality condition in
the standard framework. They just take Pt as given in the sense that there are so
many firms in the economy and that any individual firm cannot affect the aggregate
price level. In other words, firms treat Pt as an exogenous factor in solving their
optimization problems. More precisely, taking Pt as given and using the demand
curve6 which is given by yit = (pit/Pt)
− yt, the optimization problem of each firm
i, which is the profit maximization as
max
pit
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+sPt+s
(
pit
Pt+s
−mct+s
)
yit+s, (2.5)
yields the first order condition as in
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−
yt+s
[
1− 
− 1mct+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−1]
= 0, (2.6)
6This can be derived by the expenditure minimization of households and the market clearing
condition. See Appendix 1.B of Chapter 1 for details.
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where Qt,t+s is the stochastic discount factor, mct is the marginal cost, yit is the
individual demand of output which the firm i faces, and yt is the aggregate level
of output. Therefore, at a glance, it seems questionable that firms do not use the
information on the dynamics of the aggregate price level and just take Pt as given
when they set their optimal prices. However, we need to check the nature of the
information of (2.4). The equation is based on the fact that all firms have the same
optimal price as in (2.3). The reason we can have the same optimal price is because
all firms are equally assumed to take Pt as given in their price settings. In other
words, the same optimal price among firms is the ex-post notion which is valid only if
all firms have the same concept on Pt when choosing optimal prices. In the standard
framework, Pt is assumed to be given for all firms, and only then, the same optimal
price and the information on the dynamics of Pt as in (2.4) can be obtained. If any
of the firms deal with Pt differently, then (2.3) and (2.4) do not hold any longer.
The two equations are just outcomes of pricing with the assumption of given Pt, not
the information which can be used in the process of pricing. In this sense, it is very
natural that firms do not use the information on the dynamics of Pt at the stage of
deriving the first order condition.
However, in spite of the discussion above, what would happen if firms actively
use the information of (2.4)? Is there any possibility that firms use the knowledge
on the relationship between their optimal prices and the aggregate price level when
adjusting prices? As we have seen above, the same optimizing behaviour of max-
imizing (2.5) for a given Pt yields the same optimal price for all firms. However,
taking Pt as given is not the only way of generating the same p
∗
t . As long as all
firms maximize their profits in the same way as in (2.5), all that is needed to achieve
the same optimal price is for the firms to deal with Pt equally regardless of how Pt
is treated. Since all firms are assumed to be rational and have all the information
on the economy, they already know the fact mentioned above at the moment of
price setting. If it is the case, it might be possible that firms want to exploit the
information on the dynamics of Pt as in (2.4) with common consent when setting
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the price. In other words, if all firms treat Pt equally as a function of (2.4) when
deriving their optimality conditions, their optimal prices would be the same, and
therefore, the information on Pt they used in price setting proves to be correct and
model-consistent. In this sense, the model of this chapter assumes that all repricing
firms take Pt as a function of their own optimal prices in anticipation of the same
behaviours of other firms. That is, they treat Pt equally as an endogenous variable
and exploit the relationship between the optimal price and the aggregate price level
as in (2.4) by using the equation in deriving their optimality condition. In such
case, we can interpret that the repricing firms behave as in collusion in the sense
that the treatment of Pt as a function of optimal price is possible only when they
have a strong conviction that all the resetting firms will deal with Pt in the same
manner. Also, it can be said that the firms behave as if they form a monopoly be-
cause they recognize that they can exercise an influence on the aggregate price level
by the treatment of information on the dynamics of Pt. Therefore, we may be able
to expect that the optimal price of the colluding firms would be different from that
of the standard model as we do with the monopolistic and competitive markets. In
the next section, a model is developed by incorporating the above assumption onto
the base of standard Calvo pricing framework, and it is checked whether the Calvo
pricing can guarantee the non-neutrality of money with the colluding firms.
2.3 Model
This chapter uses the standard Calvo framework in which households and firms make
decisions by maximizing utility and profit, respectively, and the monetary authority
carries out the policy following a standard interest rate rule. However, as explained
below, the difference from the standard model comes from the assumption that firms
behave as in collusion.
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2.3.1 Firms
A continuum of firms i ∈ [0, 1] produces its own good, yit, with hired labour, hit, as
in
yit = hit.
Given real wage, wt, the firm i’s intra-temporal problem of minimizing expenditure
gives the following condition.7
mct = wt (2.7)
Inter-temporal Problem
As in the standard Calvo framework, a fraction θ of firms cannot adjust their prices,
while the remaining firms reset their optimal prices, pit. Therefore, the aggregate
price index, P 1−t =
∫ 1
0 p
1−
it di, gives the following dynamics of aggregate price level
as
P 1−t =
∫
ωt
p1−it−1di+
∫
1−ωt
p1−it di
= θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ)(p∗t )1−, (2.8)
where ωt denotes the set of firms which have to stick to their previous levels of prices,
and p∗t is the average optimal price at time t. In our framework, all the repricing
firms have the same profit maximization problem as in (2.5) and assumed to use the
above information on the dynamics of Pt as if they were in collusion, which means
that they face the same optimization problem including the way of dealing with the
information on Pt. Therefore, their optimal prices are the same, and we can have
pit = p
∗
t for all repricing firms. In this case, the information on Pt which firms use
for their price settings turns to be
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)(pit)1−, (2.9)
7See Appendix 1.A of Chapter 1 for the derivation.
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where pit is equal to the average optimal price of the economy. This means that the
repricing firms take the aggregate price (Pt) as a function of their own optimal prices
(pit = p
∗
t ). That is, the repricing firms exploit the dynamics of the aggregate price
level, (2.8) or equivalently (2.9), in their optimization problems. Thus, given mct
and the demand for goods, each firm’s optimization problem of profit maximization
as in (2.5) can be re-expressed by the following value functions.
V¯ (p, Pt) = φ (p, Pt) + Et
[
θQt,t+1V¯ (p, Pt+1) + (1− θ)Qt,t+1V˜ (Pt)
]
(2.10)
V˜ (Pt−1) = max
p∗t
V¯ (p∗t , Pt) , (2.11)
where Pt satisfies
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)(p∗t )1−, (2.12)
and V¯ (p, Pt) denotes the value function for a firm that is not allowed to change
its price and, therefore, inherits a price p from a previous period and now faces an
aggregate price Pt. The notation of φ (p, Pt) is the real profit of a firm charging price
p and facing an aggregate price Pt as in
φ (pt, Pt) =
(
pt
Pt
−mct
)
yit. (2.13)
Qt,t+1
(
= β λt+1λt
)
denotes the stochastic discount factor where λt is a Lagrangian
multiplier of consumer’s optimization problem. V˜ (Pt−1) is the value function for
a firm that is allowed to reset its price exploiting the dynamics of the aggregate
price level which is expressed as in the transition equation, (2.12), with Pt−1 given.
Following the dynamic programming technique explained in Appendix 2.A, we have
the Euler equation for the optimality of pricing as
f1t − f2t + f3t + f4t = f5t + f6t, (2.14)
42
where
f1t = (− 1) (p˜t)1− yt + Etβθ2λt+1
λt
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)1−
pi2−2t+1 f1t+1 (2.15)
f2t = mct(p˜t)
−yt + Etβθ2
λt+1
λt
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)−
pi2−1t+1 f2t+1 (2.16)
f3t =
1− 
1− θyt + Etβθ
λt+1
λt
pi−1t+1f3t+1 (2.17)
f4t =

1− θmct(p˜t)
−1yt + Etβθ
λt+1
λt
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)−1
pit+1f4t+1 (2.18)
f5t = Et(1− θ)βθλt+1
λt
f3t+1pi
−1
t+1 + βθ
2λt+1
λt
pi−1t+1f5t+1 (2.19)
f6t = Et(1− θ)βθλt+1
λt
f4t+1pi
−1
t+1 + βθ
2λt+1
λt
pi−1t+1f6t+1, (2.20)
and p˜t(= p
∗
t /Pt) denotes the relative price, and pit(= Pt/Pt−1) denotes the gross
inflation rate.
2.3.2 Rest of the Model
Aside from firms’ optimization problems, all other parts of the model are the same
as the standard Calvo model.8 Consequently, the optimality conditions of represen-
tative household for the aggregate consumption (ct), the labour supply (ht), and the
real bond holding (bt) are given by
c−σt = λt (2.21)
Qt = βEt
(
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1
λt
)
(2.22)
λt
Wt
Pt
= λtwt = h
%
t , (2.23)
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier of the household’s utility maximization prob-
lem, Qt is the price of bonds which yields Q
−1
t as a nominal return, and Wt denotes
8See Appendix 1.B of Chapter 1 for details.
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the nominal wage. Also, the rule of monetary authority for interest rate
(
Rt = Q
−1
t
)
is given by
Rt
R
=
(pit
pi
)ηpi (yt
y
)ηy
(νt)
−1 , (2.24)
where νt is the monetary shock which follows
νt
ν
=
(νt−1
ν
)ρ
exp(et), et ∼ N(0, ς), (2.25)
with the persistence of the shocks captured by ρ. Lastly, the market clears with the
following conditions.
yt = ct (2.26)
ht = yt (2.27)
2.3.3 Equilibrium and Simulation
In the equilibrium, all the endogenous variables of ct, λt, ht, wt, yt, Rt, pit, mct,
p˜t, f1t, f2t, f3t, f4t, f5t, and f6t, and the exogenous variable of νt satisfy the set
of equations of (2.7), (2.8) and (2.14)∼(2.27). For the solution of the model, the
equations are log-linearized with the steady state values of variables, which are
presented in Appendix 2.B. The simulation of the model is performed with the very
standard calibration9 using Dynare through Matlab.
2.4 Simulation Results
2.4.1 Impulse Responses with Collusion
The model is simulated with expansionary money shocks, and the results are com-
pared to the benchmark model which is the standard Calvo model with the same
parameters. The impulse responses of the main variables of the model are given
with the comparison to those of the standard model as in Figure 2.1. Firstly, as can
be seen in the bottom left panel, the optimal price of the colluding firms is higher
9See Appendix 1.C of Chapter 1 for details.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Response Functions to the Monetary Shocks
than that of the non-colluding firms in the standard model. Consequently, we can
find that the inflation response is bigger and the output response is smaller than
that of the benchmark model. In particular, the size of output response is less than
half of that in the standard model. This implies that we have a different slope for
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) compared to the standard model. The
NKPC can be derived using the log-linearized equations, (2.58)∼(2.67), (2.69), and
(2.72)∼(2.73) in Appendix 2.B as in
pˆit = Ayˆt +BEtpˆit+1
where
A =
−(1− βθ)(1− θ)(1− βθ2)(σ + %)
(1− βθ)(1− θ)− (1− βθ2)(βθ + (1− βθ))
B =
(1− βθ)(1− θ)(βθ + 1− βθ2)− β(1− βθ2)
(1− βθ)(1− θ)− (1− βθ2)(βθ + (1− βθ)) .
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Figure 2.2: Slope of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Figure 2.2 shows that slope of the NKPC in this model, A, is much gentler than
that of the benchmark model10 for all θ with the standard calibration of β = 0.99,
 = 11, and σ = % = 1.
With the gentler NKPC, the model generates much lower output response against
positive monetary shocks. This means that the real effect of money on the econ-
omy in this model is much lessened compared to the benchmark model. In the
proposed model, since the repricing firms behave as in collusion, they have a more
monopolistic status than the firms following the standard Calvo framework. With
this monopolistic power, they can raise their prices higher in response to the positive
monetary shocks. This pricing behaviour can be confirmed in the bottom right panel
of Figure 2.1 which shows that mark-up of the colluding firm’s reset price is much
higher than that of the standard model. The increased mark-up leads to the higher
level of individual reset price and aggregate price as well. Since much more shocks
are absorbed by the higher response of the aggregate price level, the output response
naturally becomes much lower compared to the standard model. This result shows
that even though the price of individual firm is sticky, the aggregate price level may
not be so rigid if the firms which are allowed to change by the Calvo signal adjust
their prices fully enough to absorb the shocks.
10In the standard model, the slope of the NKPC is given by (1− βθ)(1− θ)(σ + %)/θ.
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< θs = θc = 2/3 > < θs = 0.5154, θc = 2/3 >
Figure 2.3: Recalibration Exercise
⇒
2.4.2 Collusion and Price Stickiness
In order to check if there is another factor bringing about the decrease in output
response, the recalibration exercise is implemented as conducted in Chapter 1. That
is, θ of the standard model is adjusted to get the same amount of inflation response
as the colluding firms model, and then it is checked how large the output response is
compared to that of the colluding firms model. The left panels of Figure 2.3 show the
same impulse responses as we have seen in the previous section in which the degree
of price stickiness of the benchmark model (θs) is the same as that of the colluding
firms model (θc) at the level of 2/3. However, the right panels represent the results
of the case where θs is recalibrated to 0.5154, which assures the same amount of
inflation response as the colluding firms model in which θc is still maintained at 2/3.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions with Different θ
As can be seen, the output response of the recalibrated standard model shows the
same amount of that of the colluding firms model. This result seems to indicate
that the model with colluding firms is nothing but the standard Calvo model with
a lower value of θ. In other words, the only thing we do by assuming that there is
collusion between repricing firms in the model seems to be just lowering the fraction
of firms which are stuck to their current prices in the benchmark model.
However, this is not the whole story. As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the impulse
responses of the model with various levels of θ are very different from those of
the standard Calvo model. As stated above, with θ equal to be 2/3, the model
produces real effect of money that is about 50% as large as in the benchmark model.
However, with θ = 0.615, the output response is around zero which means that
money is almost neutral. This is not just cutting the real effect of the benchmark
model by half. As is well known, in the standard Calvo model, we should set θ
to be zero in order to get the fully neutral money. Therefore, the fact that we
can produce the neutrality of money even with very high value of θ is the most
interesting feature of the proposed model. If θ gets much smaller, we can find that
the real effect of money occurs in the opposite direction. Figure 2.4 shows that the
aggregate output drops down in response to the expansionary money shock when θ
is equal to 0.55. This is because the aggregate inflation, even with such degree of
price stickiness, goes up higher than the level where the effects of shocks are fully
absorbed. Figure 2.5 demonstrates that the optimal price of colluding firms with
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Figure 2.5: Comparison to the Flexible Economy in the Standard Model
θc = 0.55 is much higher than that of the standard flexible economy with θs = 0
so that the aggregate price level, even dampened by the non-repricing firms as of
half of the economy, goes up beyond the limit which non-colluding firms can make
in the standard framework. This result shows that the fraction of repricing firms
which are in collusion get bigger as θ gets smaller, and therefore, the effect of rising
prices by the colluding firms overwhelm the economy so that we can have negative
response of output even with the positive monetary shocks.
2.4.3 Collusion in Extreme Cases of Price Stickiness
In the above section, we have seen that the monopolistic power of colluding firms
makes much bigger response of inflation to monetary shocks compared to the stan-
dard Calvo model. Furthermore, the effect of collusion gets bigger as the degree
of price stickiness gets smaller. This section examines whether the above results
still hold with the extreme cases of price stickiness. In other words, it is checked
in this section if the effect of collusion can be found even with extremely high de-
gree of price stickiness and if the effect keeps growing as the degree of sticky price
approaches zero. Firstly, given the previous result which shows a greater effect of
collusion with smaller price stickiness, it can be anticipated that the opposite case
will occur in which the effect of collusion is reduced as price stickiness approaches
the maximum level. Such anticipation also matches our intuition. When θ gets
larger and approaches one, the fraction of colluding firms becomes infinitely small.
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Figure 2.6: Extreme Cases of Price Stickiness
Therefore, no matter how high they set their optimal prices, they cannot affect the
aggregate price level. Figure 2.6 confirms such anticipation showing that the impulse
responses of colluding firms model are the same as those of the standard one when
the degree of price stickiness is extremely high (θ = 0.999). Secondly, would the
inference based on the results in above section also match our intuition in another
extreme case of price stickiness? We have seen that the collusion effect gets bigger
as θ gets smaller so that the inflation response could reach above the level of the
standard flexible economy. The extension of logical reasoning on this result is that
inflation goes up infinitely high when θ approaches zero. However, the reasoning
does not entirely coincide with our intuition. On the one hand, firms know that
their optimal prices can affect the aggregate price level, and therefore, they have
incentive to have the monopolistic gains by adjusting the aggregate levels of price
and output. Moreover, with θ = 0, even a slightly higher reset price can bring about
an infinitely high inflation response. In this sense, it seems that the colluding effect
would be extremely big when θ is very close to zero. However, on the other hand,
colluding firms also gain the monopoly profit through the adjustment of the relative
price (p∗t /Pt) using the information on the dynamics of the aggregate price level as
of (2.12). When θ is equal to zero, the dynamics of P ∗t turns to just Pt = p∗t , which
means that all firms in the economy have the same price, and therefore, the relative
price is fixed to one. Hence, in this case, there is no room for firms to get extra profit
by adjusting the relative price. Therefore, the increase in the inflation response will
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses with Different Price Stickiness
not be continued forever. Figure 2.6 supports this reasoning by demonstrating that
the colluding firms give much higher response of inflation compared to the standard
model when θ is very close to zero (θ = 0.001), but the response does not show
an extremely steep rise. Therefore, we can expect that the colluding effect, which
yields higher inflation response compared to the standard model, gets bigger as θ
gets smaller but is finite even when θ becomes closer to zero. For the confirmation
of such expectation, it is examined how the inflation and output responses vary as
θ goes from zero to 0.999 in the colluding firms model. Figure 2.7 shows the results
of the impulse responses in the first period after monetary shocks. As can be seen,
the results generally coincide with our expectations. We can see that the responses
are almost the same as the standard model when θ is very high (θ > 0.9). However,
unless θ is so high (θ < 0.9), colluding firms set higher optimal prices compared to
that of the standard model, and the inflation response gets bigger as θ gets smaller.
Also, we can observe that though the inflation goes high when θ approaches zero, it
does not go to infinity. However, Figure 2.7 shows that the model has no equilibrium
at the point where θ is equal to 0 which is marked by a bullet point in the figure.
This unexpected result seems to be due to the extraordinary property of the model
structure. As presented in Appendix 2.B, the steady state values of many variables
are expressed as functions of θ, and they affect the equilibrium of the model. In
particular, we need to focus on the steady state value of marginal cost (mc) which
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is calculated by solving (2.14) with the steady state values of f1t ∼ f6t (f1 ∼ f6).
With θ = 0, we have f1 = ( − 1)y, f2 = mcy, f3 = (1 − )y, f4 = mcy, f5 = 0,
and f6 = 0. Therefore, (2.14) is expressed by
f1 − f2 + f3 + f4 = f5 + f6
⇔ (− 1)y − mcy + (1− )y + mcy = 0. (2.28)
As can be seen, (2.28) is an identical equation, and therefore, mc cannot be defined,
which makes the model have no stable equilibrium. Considering that the level of θ
is very high in most economies as shown in many micro evidences, zero degree of
price stickiness is out of our main interest. However, the indeterminacy of the model
with θ = 0 is still problematic in terms of model compatibility and should be solved
in future researches.
2.5 Conclusion and Further Research
Colluding firms have incentives to set high prices in order to gain monopolistic
profits. We have seen that such incentive of repricing firms in the modified Calvo
framework gives rise to a much higher optimal price and, therefore, a much bigger
inflation response to monetary shocks, compared to the standard model. Further-
more, the model shows that, unless the degree of price stickiness is extremely low
or high, the effect of firms’ collusion gets bigger as economy becomes more flexible,
and therefore, we could get even fully neutral money with a certain level of price
stickiness.
These results show that the real effect of money in the economy of colluding firms
can be very small or even none with the existence of price stickiness among individual
firms which is generated by the Calvo framework. In other words, even if a certain
fraction of firms maintain their prices at the level of the previous period, that is,
even if individual prices are sticky, the aggregate price level may be rather flexible
under certain circumstances like the case where firms which are to adjust prices
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respond very elastically to monetary shock as in the proposed model. Consequently,
the conventional belief that price stickiness is the main driving force of rigid inflation
and monetary non-neutrality is challenged with this model.
Also, the results of the model provide some implications with respect to monetary
policy. This chapter shows that when firms behave as in collusion the effect of
monetary policy can be very small. Therefore, central banks need to make a close
investigation on market structures of the economy, particularly with respect to the
degree of monopoly before establishing a macro model for monetary policy analysis.
Furthermore, they need to research how to incorporate the information on market
power into the monetary model.
Even though the argument of this paper is very clear, there are still some further
researches necessary. Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, this model cannot
show the responses of the main variables when the economy is fully flexible. For the
fineness of the model, this issue should be made up for in future research. Secondly,
in this chapter, the model with relatively high fraction of repricing firms reveals
a negative output response to positive monetary shocks, which is contrary to our
conventional knowledge and empirical evidences. More analyses on this result need
to be carried out from the viewpoint of monetary policy. Third, the framework
which is used in this paper for simulation is a very simple Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model. It is required to check whether the results of the model
with colluding firms are robust even under more augmented framework which, for
example, includes wage rigidity, indexation, capital adjustment costs, and habit in
consumption. Finally, empirical studies should be carried out to support the model
of this chapter. Through empirical assessments, we need to check whether the
theoretical predictions of this model lead to actual occurrences. In other words, it
is necessary to check empirically whether monetary policy actually has less effect in
an economy in which firms have more monopoly power, rather than in an economy
with relatively more competitive markets.
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Appendix 2.A
In this appendix, the Euler equation for a firm’s optimal price is derived. From the
Bellman equation which solves the value function for colluding firms, (2.11), we have
the First Order Condition (FOC) as in
FOC :
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
+
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂p∗t
= 0. (2.29)
The Envelope Condition for this Bellman equation (E˜C) is given by
E˜C :
∂V˜ (Pt−1)
∂Pt−1
=
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
. (2.30)
From the Bellman equation which solves the value function for firms which are not
allowed to change prices, (2.10), we get the derivative of V¯ evaluated at p∗t with
respect to Pt as
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
=
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
+ (1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+1
∂V˜ (Pt)
∂Pt
]
. (2.31)
Substituting (2.31) into FOC (2.29) gives
0 =
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
+
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂p∗t
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂p∗t
+ (1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+1
∂V˜ (Pt)
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂p∗t
⇒(1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+1
∂V˜ (Pt)
∂Pt
]
= −
(
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
/
∂Pt
∂p∗t
)
− ∂φ (p
∗
t , Pt)
∂Pt
− θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
, (2.32)
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and putting (2.31) into E˜C (2.30) yields
∂V˜ (Pt−1)
∂Pt−1
=
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
+ (1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+1
∂V˜ (Pt)
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
. (2.33)
With (2.32) and (2.33), we have
∂V˜ (Pt−1)
∂Pt−1
=
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
−
(
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
/
∂Pt
∂p∗t
)
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
− ∂φ (p
∗
t , Pt)
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
− θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
=−
(
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
/
∂Pt
∂p∗t
)
∂Pt
∂Pt−1
. (2.34)
Iterating (2.34) forward one period, we have
∂V˜ (Pt)
∂Pt
= −
(
∂V¯
(
p∗t+1, Pt+1
)
∂p∗t+1
/
∂Pt+1
∂p∗t+1
)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
. (2.35)
Substituting (2.35) into (2.32) gives
(1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+1
(
∂V¯
(
p∗t+1, Pt+1
)
∂p∗t+1
/
∂Pt+1
∂p∗t+1
)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
=
(
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
/
∂Pt
∂p∗t
)
+
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
. (2.36)
From (2.31), we have
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
=
∂φ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
+ θEt+1
[
Qt+1,t+2
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+2)
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+1
]
+ (1− θ)Et+1
[
Qt+1,t+2
∂V˜ (Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
]
. (2.37)
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Putting (2.37) into (2.36), we get
(1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+1
(
∂V¯
(
p∗t+1, Pt+1
)
∂p∗t+1
/
∂Pt+1
∂p∗t+1
)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
=
(
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
/
∂Pt
∂p∗t
)
+
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂φ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
+ θ2Et
[
Qt,t+2
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+2)
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
+ θ(1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+2
∂V˜ (Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
. (2.38)
Iterating (2.35) forward one period, we have
∂V˜ (Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
= −
(
∂V¯
(
p∗t+2, Pt+2
)
∂p∗t+2
/
∂Pt+2
∂p∗t+2
)
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+1
. (2.39)
Putting (2.39) into (2.38) yields
(1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+1
(
∂V¯
(
p∗t+1, Pt+1
)
∂p∗t+1
/
∂Pt+1
∂p∗t+1
)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
=
(
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
/
∂Pt
∂p∗t
)
+
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂Pt
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂φ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
+ θ2Et
[
Qt,t+2
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+2)
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
− θ(1− θ)Et
[
Qt,t+2
(
∂V¯
(
p∗t+2, Pt+2
)
∂p∗t+2
/
∂Pt+2
∂p∗t+2
)
∂Pt+2
∂Pt+1
∂Pt+1
∂Pt
]
. (2.40)
Iterating forward by repeating the same procedures and rearranging, we have
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
∂φ (p∗t , Pt+s)
∂Pt+s
Γt+s +
(
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
/
∂Pt
∂p∗t
)
= Et
∞∑
k=0
(1− θ)θkQt,t+1+k
(
∂V¯
(
p∗t+1+k, Pt+1+k
)
∂p∗t+1+k
/
∂Pt+1+k
∂p∗t+1+k
)
Γt+1+k, (2.41)
where
Γt+n =

∏n
i=1
∂Pt+i
∂Pt+i−1 for n > 0
1 for n = 0
and Qt,t+s = β
sλt+s
λt
. (2.42)
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From (2.10), we have the derivative of V¯ evaluated at p∗t with respect to p∗t as
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
=
∂φ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt+1)
∂p∗t
]
. (2.43)
Iterating this forward repeatedly, we get
∂V¯ (p∗t , Pt)
∂p∗t
= Et
∞∑
s=0
θs
[
Qt,t+s
∂φ (p∗t , Pt+s)
∂p∗t
]
. (2.44)
A firm’s real profit, φ, is given by
φ (p∗t , Pt) =
(
p∗t
Pt
−mct
)
yit. (2.45)
Since an individual firm faces the following demand curve as
yit = yt
(
p∗t
Pt
)−
, (2.46)
we can re-express (2.45) as
φ (p∗t , Pt) =
[(
p∗t
Pt
)1−
−mct
(
p∗t
Pt
)−]
yt. (2.47)
Then the derivatives of φ evaluated at p∗t with respect to p∗t and Pt+s are given by
∂φ (p∗t , Pt+s)
∂p∗t
=
[
(1− )
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)−
+ mct+s
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)−−1] yt+s
Pt+s
(2.48)
and
∂φ (p∗t , Pt+s)
∂Pt+s
=
[
(− 1)
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)1−
− mct+s
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)−] yt+s
Pt+s
. (2.49)
From the transition equation, (2.12), we have
Γt+n =
 θ
n
∏n
i=1 pi

t+i for n > 0
1 for n = 0
(2.50)
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and
∂Pt
∂p∗t
= (1− θ)
(
p∗t
Pt
)−
. (2.51)
Therefore, using (2.44) and (2.48)∼(2.51), we can re-express (2.41) as
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βθ2
)s λt+s
λt
(− 1)
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)1− yt+s
Pt+s
s∏
i=1
pit+i
− Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βθ2
)s λt+s
λt
mct+s
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)− yt+s
Pt+s
s∏
i=1
pit+i
+ Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)s
λt+s
λt
1− 
1− θ
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)− yt+s
Pt+s
(
p∗t
Pt
)
+ Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)s
λt+s
λt

1− θmct+s
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)−−1 yt+s
Pt+s
(
p∗t
Pt
)
= Et
∞∑
k=0
(1− θ)(βθ)k+1θkλt+1+k
λt
(A+ B)
k+1∏
i=1
pit+i, (2.52)
where A and B denote
A =
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)s
λt+1+k+s
λt+1+k
1− 
1− θ
(
p∗t+1+k
Pt+1+k+s
)−
yt+1+k+s
Pt+1+k+s
(
p∗t+1+k
Pt+1+k
)
B =
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)s
λt+1+k+s
λt+1+k

1− θmct+1+k+s
(
p∗t+1+k
Pt+1+k+s
)−−1
yt+1+k+s
Pt+1+k+s
(
p∗t+1+k
Pt+1+k
)
,
and
∏s
i=1 pi

t+i = 1 for s = 0. Multiply both sides of (2.52) by Pt, and let f1t, f2t,
f3t and f4t denote the followings as in
f1t =Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βθ2
)s λt+s
λt
(− 1)
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)1− yt+s
Pt+s
Pt
s∏
i=1
pit+i (2.53)
f2t =Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βθ2
)s λt+s
λt
mct+s
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)− yt+s
Pt+s
Pt
s∏
i=1
pit+i (2.54)
f3t =Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)s
λt+s
λt
1− 
1− θ
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)− yt+s
Pt+s
(
p∗t
Pt
)
Pt (2.55)
f4t =Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)s
λt+s
λt

1− θmct+s
(
p∗t
Pt+s
)−−1 yt+s
Pt+s
(
p∗t
Pt
)
Pt. (2.56)
58
Then (2.52) can be re-expressed as
f1t − f2t + f3t + f4t
= Et
∞∑
k=0
(1− θ)(βθ)k+1θkλt+1+k
λt
(f3t+1+k + f4t+1+k)
k+1∏
i=1
pi−1t+i .
This can be expressed in recursive form as follows.
f1t − f2t + f3t + f4t = f5t + f6t, (2.57)
where
f1t = (− 1) (p˜t)1− yt + Etβθ2λt+1
λt
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)1−
pi2−2t+1 f1t+1
f2t = mct(p˜t)
−yt + Etβθ2
λt+1
λt
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)−
pi2−1t+1 f2t+1
f3t =
1− 
1− θyt + Etβθ
λt+1
λt
pi−1t+1f3t+1
f4t =

1− θmct(p˜t)
−1yt + Etβθ
λt+1
λt
(
p˜t
p˜t+1
)−1
pit+1f4t+1
f5t = Et(1− θ)βθλt+1
λt
f3t+1pi
−1
t+1 + βθ
2λt+1
λt
pi−1t+1f5t+1
f6t = Et(1− θ)βθλt+1
λt
f4t+1pi
−1
t+1 + βθ
2λt+1
λt
pi−1t+1f6t+1
p˜t = p
∗
t /Pt.
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Appendix 2.B
Log-linearization
The equations of (2.7), (2.8) and (2.14)∼(2.27) which constitute the model are re-
spectively log-linearized as in
mˆct =wˆt (2.58)
ˆ˜pt =
θ
1− θ pˆit (2.59)
f1fˆ1t =f2fˆ2t − f3fˆ3t − f4fˆ4t + f5fˆ5t + f6fˆ6t (2.60)
fˆ1t =(1− βθ2)
(
(1− )ˆ˜pt + yˆt
)
+ βθ2Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + (1− )(ˆ˜pt − ˆ˜pt+1) + (2− 2)pˆit+1 + fˆ1t+1
]
(2.61)
fˆ2t =(1− βθ2)
(
mˆct −  ˆ˜pt + yˆt
)
+ βθ2Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt − (ˆ˜pt − ˆ˜pt+1) + (2− 1)pˆit+1 + fˆ2t+1
]
(2.62)
fˆ3t =(1− βθ)yˆt + βθEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + (− 1)pˆit+1 + fˆ3t+1
]
(2.63)
fˆ4t =(1− βθ)
(
mˆct −  ˆ˜pt + yˆt
)
+ βθEt
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt − (ˆ˜pt − ˆ˜pt+1) + pˆit+1 + fˆ4t+1
]
(2.64)
fˆ5t =(1− βθ2)Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + fˆ3t+1 + (− 1)pˆit+1
]
+ βθ2Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + (− 1)pˆit+1 + fˆ5t+1
]
(2.65)
fˆ6t =(1− βθ2)Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + fˆ4t+1 + (− 1)pˆit+1
]
+ βθ2Et
[
λˆt+1 − λˆt + (− 1)pˆit+1 + fˆ6t+1
]
(2.66)
λˆt =− σcˆt (2.67)
λˆt =Et
[
λˆt+1
]
− Et [pˆit+1] + Rˆt (2.68)
%hˆt =λˆt + wˆt (2.69)
Rˆt =ηpipˆit + ηyyˆt + νˆt (2.70)
νˆt =ρνˆt−1 + et (2.71)
yˆt =cˆt (2.72)
yˆt =hˆt. (2.73)
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Steady State
The steady state values of all the endogenous and exogenous variables are presented
in the following Table 2.1.
Variable Steady State
pi, ν, p˜ 1
R 1/β
mc (− 1)/
y mc
1
σ+%
h, c y
λ c−σ
w mc
f1 (− 1)y/(1− βθ2)
f2 mcy/(1− βθ2)
f3 (1− )y/ {(1− βθ)(1− θ)}
f4 mcy/ {(1− βθ)(1− θ)}
f5 (1− θ)βθf3/(1− βθ2)
f6 (1− θ)βθf4/(1− βθ2)
Table 2.1: Steady State Values of Variables of Colluding Firms Model
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Chapter 3
Expectations on Other Firms’
Pricing Behaviours and the Real
Effect of Money
3.1 Introduction
The New Keynesian model has long been a workhorse in analysing monetary policy.
In the framework of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, the model generates
the non-neutrality of money with rational firms facing nominal price stickiness on
a monopolistically competitive market. In particular, price stickiness is regarded
as one of the main driving forces of the real effect of money which supports the
effectiveness of monetary policy on the real activity in the economy. To feature
price stickiness, it is usually assumed that some firms are not allowed to change
prices as in Calvo (1983) or that the update process of information is not quite
frequent because of the costs involved as suggested by Mankiw and Reis (2002).1
With price stickiness featured as above, the optimal prices which the rational firms
choose by optimizing the profit-maximization problems are not so responsive to
1Menu cost models as in Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1991), Dotsey, King,
and Wolman (1999), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Gertler and Leahy (2008), and Midrigan (2011)
suggest another way of featuring price stickiness by assuming that firms adjust prices only when
the benefits is greater than the costs of resetting prices.
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monetary shocks in the New Keynesian model.
We can easily find that prices of individual firms are sticky in the sense that they
are not reset at every period. Also, numerous papers like Bils and Klenow (2004),
Angeloni et al. (2006), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and Klenow and Malin
(2010) provide the micro evidences of the phenomenon of sticky price. However, it is
open to debate whether such price stickiness can always generate the non-neutrality
of money. Caplin and Spulber (1987) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) assert that
money can be neutral even if the price of each individual firm is not flexible due to
the menu costs when adjusting price. However, many papers such as Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), and Midrigan (2011) argue that
the non-neutrality of money can be obtained even in such menu cost framework if
the model features the wide dispersion of price changes which is observed in the
real economy. Also, Head et al. (2012) claims that price stickiness has nothing to
do with the real effect of money showing that price can be sticky even in a flexible
economy. However, there has been criticism that price stickiness in the framework
of the New Monetarist Economics,2 which Head et al. (2012) use, has a different
meaning from that of the standard New Keynesian model.3
As seen above, various opinions have been stated and debated on the relation-
ship between price stickiness and the real effect of money. However, if we confine
our interest to the New Keynesian framework, the area of debate has been primar-
ily focused on the menu cost models rather than other popular frameworks such
as Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Even though the most popular and the most
commonly used tool in featuring price stickiness is the Calvo framework, no question
has been raised on whether the Calvo-style price stickiness can always produce the
non-neutrality of money. The purpose of this chapter is to test the degree of interre-
lationship between the two phenomenons. Particularly, this chapter gives attention
to the rationality assumption of the standard Calvo framework and tests whether
we can still find the close relationship between price stickiness and the real effect of
2See Williamson and Wright (2010a, 2010b) for detailed overviews.
3See Kryvtsov (2010) and Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) for detailed discussions.
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money even if the basic assumption of rationality is relaxed. In this chapter, the
relaxed rationality provides the endogenous mechanism which brings about the high
volatility of firms’ reset prices as is shown in Chapter 1 resulting in a more flexible
inflationary response even with price stickiness, and it is checked whether the result
of Chapter 1 can be replicated.
The assumption of rationality is commonly used in macroeconomic models for
its usefulness. In the standard New Keynesian model, it has two different mean-
ings. Firstly, all agents’ behaviours are decided by maximizing or minimizing their
objective functions within their information sets. The second one is that they have
‘rational expectations’, which means agents’ expectations coincide with the realized
one in the model.4 Under such assumption, the model can be simplified such that we
can easily understand the sophistication of the economic agents’ behaviours.5 How-
ever, the assumption of rational agents requires two additional implicit assumptions.
One is that agents have perfect knowledge about the model and share it as a common
information set. The other is that they have such a strong ability of calculation as to
solve extremely complicated optimization problems with infinite horizon. However,
these requirements are nearly impossible to meet in the real world. Many experi-
ments such as in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) demonstrate the biases of
decisions made by people. Also, Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) argue that ratio-
nality cannot be supported for the inflation forecasts by showing that expectations
on median inflation have been biased and inefficient.6 In this sense, there have been
many attempts to relax the strong assumption of rationality. Since Simon (1955,
1957), numerous literature assumes that agents are ‘boundedly rational’ due to their
limited knowledge and restricted ability of calculation so that their behaviours can
lead to a systematic bias and a discrepancy between the agents’ expectations and
4In other words, the expectations are model-consistent.
5For example, with the rational expectation hypothesis, all we need to take into consideration
is just the agent’s expectation for only the next period, not for the infinitely long horizon, due to
the law of iterated expectations.
6Similarly, Souleles (2004) shows that households’ expectations are biased and inefficient, and
Capistran and Timmermann (2009) claim that the assumption of rationality cannot explain the
tendency of under- and over-prediction of inflation observed in the US survey data.
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the realized one. The main objective of this chapter is to examine how such relax-
ation of agent’s rationality affects the relationship between price stickiness and the
non-neutrality of money.
Therefore, this chapter basically builds on the assumption of irrational agents so
as to belong to the stream of literature modelling bounded rationality. However, this
chapter differs from the literature in the sense that the relaxation of rationality is at
its minimal level. Firstly, the bounded rationality is confined to only firms. While
the literature assumes that all agents in an economy are irrational, households and
monetary authority in this chapter are still assumed to be fully rational as in the
standard model. Secondly, the degree of restriction to the knowledge which firms
can access is also set to a minimum. Unlike most of the literature,7 this chapter
assumes that the boundedly rational firms have most of the information on the
economic structure of the model, and the only missing information is the dynamics
of the aggregate price level which is explained in detail below. Also, this chapter
maintains the assumption that firms have enough computational capability so that
they can solve the optimization problems with the same degree of complexity as in
the standard model with rational firms. This enables the firms in the model to solve
their own optimization problems and choose the reset prices as the rational firms
do in the standard model, once the gap in the information set is filled with their
subjective expectations.
As stated above, firms in the model of this chapter have all the information
about the economic structure except for the dynamics of the aggregate price level.
The formulation of Calvo pricing is also in the information set given to firms. In
other words, all firms know that only a certain fraction of firms can adjust their
prices a´ la Calvo (1983) and that the rest maintains the previous level of price. This
means it is known to firms that the aggregate price level is decided by the weighted
combination of the price in the previous period and the average of reset prices in
7Most literature with bounded rationality assumes that agents have no information on any
structure of economic system so that they have to have their own expectations on the law of motion
for the economy or on the main variables such as inflation and output.
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the current period. That is, firms have information on how the dynamics of the
aggregate price level is structured. However, the incompleteness of the information
comes from the assumption that firms are not aware of what the average reset price
would be. If firms are all rational and have the information that all firms face
the same optimization problem, they will also know that their reset prices would
be the same. This enables each individual firm in the standard model to have
exact information that the average reset price is the same as its own optimal price.
However, in the model of this chapter, firms are assumed to have no information
on how other firms’ prices would be decided, and consequently, they cannot know
what the average of firms’ reset prices would be. This makes the information on the
dynamics of the aggregate price level incomplete to each individual firm.
Without full knowledge on how the aggregate price level varies, firms cannot
optimize their reset prices. Therefore, firms might try to fill in the missing part
of the information. In this sense, each individual firm of this model is assumed to
have its own expectation on the average reset price in order to make up for the
incompleteness of the information on the dynamics of the aggregate price level. In
having expectation on the average reset price, firms are assumed to be boundedly
rational in the sense that they use simple heuristics due to the limited knowledge
on other firms’ pricing behaviours. With the heuristics on average reset price, firms
come to have their own subjective information on the dynamics of the aggregate price
level. Hence, given the subjective expectations, firms can choose their optimal prices
in the same way as the rational firms do because they are assumed to have the same
high level of computing ability as addressed above. However, since the expectation
on average reset price is established in an irrational way,8 which might lead to
systematic biases, firms’ ex-ante expectations on the future variables as solutions of
their perceived model cannot coincide with the ex-post realized equilibrium of the
model.
The reset prices chosen by the individual firms behaving in the above-mentioned
8This means that firms do not know the true feature of the dynamics of the aggregate price
level.
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manners are different from those in the standard model. Most of all, the simulation
results of the model with positive monetary shocks show that, when each firm’s
subjective expectation on the average reset price of all repricing firms is smaller
than its own, the price chosen by the individual firm is higher than that of the
fully rational firms. Consequently, the realized response of inflation is higher even
though the firm’s expectation is much lower than that of the standard model. A
firm’s expectation of lower aggregate price naturally leads to an expectation of higher
output level, which means that the firm comes to anticipate a higher demand against
which it has an incentive to raise its price. A lower aggregate price level also means
a higher relative price, and therefore, the firm would have an incentive to lower its
price. However, the effect of higher demand is much greater than that of the higher
relative price when shocks are persistent as in the proposed model. This is because
the persistent shocks lead to an anticipation of continuous increases of demand in
the future, and firms have much incentive to raise prices in advance in consideration
of not being able to adjust their prices in subsequent periods due to price stickiness.
This model also shows that heterogeneity of firms’ subjective expectations on the
average reset price gives rise to higher aggregated level of firms’ chosen prices, even
if the average of firms’ various expectations is the same as that of the rational firms.
In other words, even if a median firm9 believes that the average of all firms’ reset
prices would be the same as its own as the rational firms do in the standard model,
the realized level of average reset price is higher than the median firm’s reset price
which is the same as in the standard model, once the expectations of individual firms
are different from one another and dispersed enough. This is because the deviation
of firm’s price from the standard model is not the same between the two opposite
cases of expectations: lower and higher average reset price. By the same reasoning
as in the above case of lower expectation, a firm which expects higher average reset
price sets its price at a lower level compared to the standard model. However,
the difference from the standard model is smaller than that of the opposite case.
9The median firm here denotes the firm whose expectation is the same as the average of all
firms’ expectations.
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Even though the firm’s incentive to raise price is reduced due to the anticipation
of lower output response which comes from the higher expectation on the average
reset price and inflation response, the firm still has concerns about the possibility
of not receiving the Calvo signal to adjust its price next period. Hence, with such
fear, the firm needs to hold its price at a certain high level in advance. In other
words, price stickiness which the firm faces props up the level of reset price. Due to
these reasons, the difference of a firm’s reset price from the standard model in this
case is smaller than that of the opposite case, and therefore, the average of the two
cases is higher than the optimal price of the standard model. Consequently, this
indicates that the heterogeneous expectations can make the response of inflation
higher.10 Furthermore, in the model, such responsive inflation is maintained unless
the update speed of expectation is so high.
All these results indicate that if firms have different expectations on the average
reset price and if some of their expectations are inclined to a lower level than their
own, the average of the repricing firms’ reset prices can be higher than that of the
standard model due to the elastic response of firms’ pricing against the expected
change in the future demand. As a result, the real effect of money in this model
can be very small even with price stickiness featured in each firm’s price setting.
This means that price stickiness cannot guarantee the non-neutrality of money when
repricing firms have subjective expectations on the average reset price with bounded
rationality due to the limited knowledge about other firms’ pricing behaviours. In
the real world, firms are not fully rational and their information is not complete.
The model shows that price stickiness cannot ensure the effectiveness of monetary
policy under such circumstance and implies that central banks and economists need
to try to find another factor which brings about the non-neutrality of money other
than price stickiness of individual firms.
This chapter consists of the following sections. Section 3.2 addresses the litera-
10This result is consistent with the empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between
the dispersed inflation expectation and the level of realized inflation, which can be seen in Cukierman
and Wachtel (1979), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004), and Souleles (2004).
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ture which can be related to this chapter. Section 3.3 presents the main assumptions
on the information set firms have regarding the dynamics of the aggregate price level
and explains how the firms with bounded rationality deal with the information. Sec-
tion 3.4 describes the simple New Keynesian Calvo model which the firms perceive
and demonstrates how the economy is realized. In section 3.5, it is reported how
the boundedly rational firms respond to monetary shocks and how the aggregate
price and output level are different from those in the standard model. Last sec-
tion summarizes the main results of this chapter and concludes with limitations and
weaknesses of the model which can be made up for in future research.
3.2 Literature Review
This chapter can belong to a set of literature on bounded rationality in the sense that
firms in the model are assumed to be boundedly rational in expecting average reset
price. The literature on models with the bounded rationality has been led with the
popularity of ‘adaptive learning’ over the past two decades.11 Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001), Bullard and Duffy (2002), Bullard and Mitra (2002), and Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) show the determinacy and convergence to rational expectation
under adaptive learning. Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2005a, 2005b), Adam
(2005), Milani (2011), and Eusepi and Preston (2011) demonstrate that learning
can make enough persistence of the economic variables as seen in the real economy,
while Sargent and Williams (2005), McGough (2006), Cho and Kasa (2008), Ellison
and Scott (2013), and Kolyuzhnov, Bogomolova, and Slobodyan (2014) argue that
learning can yield large deviation from the rational expectation equilibrium. Even
though the economic knowledge known to the learning agents in the literature is
incomplete as in this chapter, the learning agents are still assumed to share the
information. That is, most of the learning models assume that there exists the rep-
resentative agent who holds imperfect information on the economy, but the model in
11Overview of the adaptive learning models can be seen in Sargent (1993) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2001).
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this chapter opens the possibility of heterogeneous expectations. Also, the represen-
tative agents in those literature take expectations for the reduced form of the law of
motion of the main aggregate variables in equilibrium and calculate the coefficients
of the expected form using econometric and statistical methods, while the model of
this chapter use the standard optimization process.
Therefore, this chapter relates more to another stream of literature with bounded
rationality which deals with heterogeneous expectations with imperfect informa-
tion. The examples in this category include Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006),
Berardi (2007), Dennis and Ravenna (2008), Branch and McGough (2009, 2010),
Grauwe (2010), Anufriev, Assenza, Hommes, and Massaro (2008), and Massaro
(2013). These papers assume that agents use simple but different heuristics for
their own expectations with the support of empirical evidences for heterogeneous
forecasts provided by various literature such as Carroll (2003), Mankiw, Reis, and
Wolfers (2004), Branch (2004), and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010). However, the dif-
ference from the model in this chapter comes from the fact that the agents in those
literature establish direct expectations on inflation or output which are the main
variables of the economy; whereas, in this chapter, firms’ heuristics are for just av-
erage reset price, and the expectations on inflation or output are derived through
firms’ optimization processes as in the standard model, even though the expecta-
tions are not model-consistent. This is due to the differences in assumptions made
on firms’ information sets between this model and the ones in literature. As men-
tioned above, the model of this chapter assumes that all information other than the
average reset price is given to firms, which means firms know how the aggregate
variables are determined. Therefore, firms can derive the equilibrium level of infla-
tion and output once their missing information is filled with their own subjective
expectations. However, in most literature, the only thing that firms know is their
own optimization problems and the corresponding constraints. All other informa-
tion needed for the derivation of aggregate variables is not given. Consequently, in
such setup, firms must have expectations on inflation or output level. Also, the liter-
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ature in this stream mainly deals with the determinacy and stability of equilibrium
in relation to the design of monetary policy. However, this chapter focuses on the
real effect of money under price stickiness with firms’ irrational and heterogeneous
expectations in comparison to the standard model with the rational expectation.
If we broaden the category of our interest to rational expectations, we can find
numerous literature focusing on inflation dynamics under price stickiness with im-
perfect and heterogeneous information. The literature relates to this chapter in the
sense that they assume the information on economic structure is not complete to
each individual firm. Demery and Duck (2001), Nimark (2008), Angeletos and La’O
(2009), and Lorenzoni (2009) show gradual response of inflation when idiosyncratic
or noisy factors are mixed with aggregate shocks. However, these are for marginal
cost, demand, or productivity shocks which are not appropriate for analysing of the
non-neutrality of money. Even though Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009)12 deal
with monetary shocks, they assume a fully flexible economy in which firms are free
to adjust their prices, which is inadequate for analysing the effect of price stickiness
on the non-neutrality of money. However, the biggest difference between these pa-
pers and the model of this chapter is that firms are able to have exact information
on how the other firms reset their prices. In the literature, firms know that all firms
have the same optimization problem13 even though their information on the shocks
is incomplete and different from one another. Also, the idiosyncratic or noisy parts
which give rise to uncertainty or incompleteness of the information are assumed to
be drawn from certain distributions which are known to firms exactly. Therefore,
firms can calculate the probability of distribution of other firms’ prices, and the pre-
dictions are consistent with the realized one. However, in this chapter, firms neither
have an idea on the other firms’ optimization problems nor on the distributions of
the idiosyncratic or noisy shocks.
The model in this chapter shows that the real effect of money on the economy
12This paper can also be classified into the category explained in the next paragraph in the sense
that the authors demonstrate the possibility of nearly neutral money.
13This means that all firms know that they choose their reset prices in the same way of maxi-
mizing the present value of expected future profits through infinitely long horizons.
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can be reduced when repricing firms set their reset prices with high volatility due
to, for example, incomplete information and limited calculation ability. In this
sense, this chapter shares the implications on the effect of price stickiness on the
non-neutrality of money with the literature14 such as Caplin and Spulber (1987),
Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Head et al. (2012), though their models are under
state-dependent menu cost framework or search friction while this chapter is based
on the standard Calvo-style sticky price model.
3.3 What Firms Know about the Aggregate Price level
As expressed in the previous chapters, an individual firm i in the standard Calvo
model chooses its optimal price following the optimality condition15 which is given
by
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−
yt+s
[
1− 
− 1mct+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−1]
= 0, (3.1)
where θ is the probability of not changing prices, Qt,t+s is the stochastic discount
factor, Pt is the aggregate price level, pit is the optimal price of firm i, mct is the
marginal cost,  is the price elasticity of demand, and yt is the aggregate output.
Since the firm is assumed to have all the information on the economy including
households’ optimality condition and the policy of monetary authority, it can have
its optimality condition as the following function.16
pit = f(Pt, EtΩt+s), (3.2)
where Ωt+s = {Pt+s, νt+s} and s > 0.
As can be seen, for the adjustment of price, an individual firm i needs the
information on Pt and its expectation on the future aggregate price level and the
monetary shocks. In the standard model, Pt is assumed to be given to all firms in the
sense that the individual firm’s price cannot affect the aggregate price level because
14See Chapter 1 for the review over the literature in this category.
15See Appendix 3.A for the derivation.
16See Appendix 3.B.
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there are so many firms in the economy. However, this does not mean that all firms
know the exact level of Pt at the moment of price setting because the aggregate price
level is decided just after all firms’ price settings are completed. Therefore, a firm
cannot have information on Pt when it resets its optimal price. However, this cannot
be a problem under the standard framework under which all firms are assumed to
be rational with perfect information and face the same decision problem. In the
standard Calvo model, only a fraction (1−θ) of firms can adjust their prices, and an
individual firm j in the fraction (1− θ) resets its optimal price (pjt) maximizing its
expected profit. Since all repricing firms are assumed to face the same optimization
problem, their optimal prices would be the same (pjt = p
∗
t , j ∈ (1− θ)). Therefore,
from the definition of the aggregate price level
(
Pt =
[∫ 1
0 p
1−
it di
] 1
1−
)
, 17 we can
get the dynamics of the aggregate price level as
P 1−t =
∫
ωt
p1−it−1di+
∫
1−ωt
p1−it di
= θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ)
∫
p1−jt dj
= θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ) (p∗t )1− , (3.3)
where ωt ⊂ [0, 1] denotes the set of firms that are unable to reset prices at time t. In
the standard model, the information on this dynamics of Pt is implicitly assumed to
be known to the repricing firms like any other information on the economy. In other
words, any individual firm in the standard model knows that all the optimal prices
of other firms will be the same as its own and the aggregate price level will be as
in (3.3). Therefore, at the moment of price setting, firm i can have the information
on Pt as a function of Pt−1 which is already known and p∗t which is the same as its
optimal price. If equation (3.3) is substituted into the function (3.2), we can have
pit = p
∗
t = f(EtΩt+s), s > 0 (3.4)
given that Pt−1 is known in period t. This equation shows that only the expectations
17See Appendix 1.B of Chapter 1 for the derivation.
73
on future variables matter in setting optimal price.
We need to note that the main assumption which enables firms to have such
information on Pt is that firms acknowledge that their optimal prices are the same.
As seen before, knowledge on the definition of the aggregate price level gives the
firms information on how Pt is set, which is expressed by
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ) (p∗t )1− , (3.5)
where p∗t is the average reset prices of all the repricing firms as follows.
(p∗t )
1− =
∫
p1−jt dj, j ∈ (1− θ) (3.6)
With the knowledge of the same optimal price, each firm i can replace p∗t by pit
which is its own optimal price and, therefore, get the exact information on Pt.
However, in the real world, it is difficult to think of a case where all firms have
the same optimal prices and also all firms know such information at the moment of
price setting. Rather, it would be more common to think that firms have no precise
information on what other firms’ prices would be.18 There are many factors which
prevent firms from obtaining information on the same optimal prices in the real
world. It might be that there are idiosyncratic productivity shocks, or that each firm
faces different price stickiness. In those cases, optimal prices of the firms cannot be
the same. However, if the rational firms have full information on such idiosyncratic
shocks or different degree of price stickiness, they can easily get the information on
Pt even without knowledge of the same optimal price. This is because they know
how p∗t is decided. For example, given the information on the distribution of the
idiosyncratic shocks, firms have expectations on how other firms set their optimal
prices against the shocks and, therefore, can have the information on the average of
18Based on such circumstance of limited information, competitor analysis (see, for example,
Smith, Grimm, and Gannon (1992) and Czepiel and Kerin (2012) for detailed explanations) be-
comes one of the main fields in marketing theory. Also, many economists, e.g., Goic and Mont-
gomery (2011), suggest econometric models to predict competitors’ pricings with such imperfect
information.
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the optimal prices.19 In addition, in such a case, firms’ beliefs on the other firms’
prices are consistent with each other because the information they have on the shocks
is true, and consequently, their subjective probability distributions can be the same
as the true ones of the aggregate variables such as inflation and output. As can be
seen in this example, what is important for the information on Pt is not whether
firms have the same optimal prices, but whether they can have information on the
average optimal prices, p∗t . In other words, if all firms know exactly how the other
firms’ optimal prices are set, they can have exact information on the aggregate price
level; but if not, they cannot. In above cases, if firms have no information on the
other firms’ idiosyncratic shocks or degree of price stickiness, they cannot know how
other firms set their optimal prices, and therefore, they cannot have information on
Pt.
In this sense, firms in this chapter are modelled not to know how other firms’
optimal prices are set. More precisely, even though all firms in the model of this
chapter face the same optimization problems as in the standard model,20 they cannot
be sure that they are setting the same optimal price because they have no information
on other firms’ pricing behaviours. This means that there is no common knowledge
about the process of choosing reset price. As in the standard model, this chapter
assumes that all firms adjust their prices maximizing the present discounted value
of the expected profits. However, unlike the standard rationality framework, the
information about the same pricing behaviour is not common to all firms.21 If the
information is common, each firm would have resolute confidence that the other
firms have the same rational optimization problem, and therefore, that they will set
the same optimal price as its own. However, in the model of this chapter, firms do
not know whether the other firms optimize in the same way as their own.22 Even
19Lots of papers featuring this kind of idiosyncratic shock solve the models with an algorithm
using higher order expectations. See Nimark (2008) for example.
20This means there is no factor which makes any heterogeneity among firms such as idiosyncratic
shocks and difference in individual price stickiness.
21This is reminiscent of the concept in game theory; Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality
(LCKR). However, the difference is that LCKR still assumes the rationality of each player in the
game while this chapter does not.
22In the real world, firms’ pricing strategies are not confined to the profit maximization used in
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if they happen to know that their pricing behaviours are based on the same way of
profit maximization, they have no idea whether the other firms have idiosyncratic
shocks, whether the shocks are noisy, or which distribution the idiosyncratic or noisy
factor of the shocks follow.23 Therefore, each individual firm in the model cannot
be sure of other firms’ pricing behaviours and, thus, cannot have any information
on the average reset price (p∗t ) of the economy. Hence, the firms cannot have such
information on the dynamics of the aggregate price level as in (3.3).
Then, what can firms do without any information on p∗t ? As we have seen in
(3.5), if p∗t is unknown, it means that there is no information on Pt either. However,
equation (3.2) shows that an individual firm needs information on Pt for its optimal
price.24 Therefore, before price setting, all firms are anticipated to establish their
expectations on p∗t using the information they have. For the purpose of estimating
p∗t , firms might want to know how many different pricing strategies exist within firms,
what they look like, and what other firms’ expectations on p∗t would be. However,
in this model, it is assumed that firms cannot have perfect information on those
factors due to their restricted availability and/or limited processing ability of the
information. Hence, their expectations on p∗t are far from rational expectation in the
sense that they do not align with the realized one after all firms’ pricing processes
are over. In this model, it is assumed that the expectation on p∗t of an individual
firm i is decided using a simple heuristic which is expressed by
E˜itp
∗
t = p
γi
itP
1−γi
t−1 , (3.7)
where E˜it is the subjective expectation operator of the firm i and γi is the weight
which the firm i puts on pit and Pt−1. There are several things to note in the
the standard macro model. See Monroe (2001) and Kotler and Armstrong (2010) for the examples
of various pricing behaviours. Firms in the model of this chapter might have the variety of pricing
patterns in minds.
23Most literature such as Nimark (2008) and Lorenzoni (2009), which models the incomplete
and dispersed information on the shocks with idiosyncratic or noisy components, assumes that the
information on the shocks is exactly given to all firms.
24More precisely, in the viewpoint of model solution, each firm needs to know the relationship
between the aggregate price level and its own reset price.
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above heuristic. Firstly, the heuristic is expressed as a function of firm i’s reset
price and the aggregate price level in the previous period. However, most literature
with bounded rationality uses constant heuristics for agents’ predictors, and one
of the predictors coincides with the equilibrium value of rational expectation. For
example, in most literature, each agent chooses one of the given set of constant
numbers for the expectation on future inflation like E˜itpˆit+1 = a, and if the agent has
rational expectation, then a would be equal to zero which is the steady state value
of equilibrium in the standard model. In our case, firms with rational expectation
would have the belief, p∗t = pit, which cannot be expressed by any certain constant,
and this shows that the plausible form of expectation on p∗t should be a function
of pit. Furthermore, by the functional form of pit, we can incorporate into the
model the implicit assumption that the value of p∗t which firms are interested in is
the relative value with respect to their own reset prices rather than the absolute
value.25 On the other hand, inclusion of Pt−1 in the function is to prevent extremely
wild irrationality. In other words, by using information on Pt−1, we can avoid the
irrational expectation on p∗t which deviates too far from the level of recent aggregate
price level. The second point to be given attention is that the main factor which
decides the firm’s expectation is the constant, γi, in the heuristic. Since the variables
in the function of heuristic are the control variable of the firm (pit) or the information
already given to all firms (Pt−1), practical factor which has significant effect on
E˜itp
∗
t is γi. For example, if a firm believes that all the other firms have the same
optimization problem as its own and has confidence that all the other firms have the
same beliefs as well, γi would be one, which is the same case as in the standard model
with rational firms. However, in other cases, γi can have any numbers. Suppose
that firm i observes expansionary monetary shock at the beginning of a period. If
it believes that there are many firms with different optimization problems from its
own and that their pricing behaviours are overwhelmed by pessimistic outlook on
25This is parallel to the phenomenon that the ‘competition-based pricing’, which refers to the
strategy of setting price at the similar value of competitor’s price, is one of the popular pricing
strategies in the modern economy. For example, Raju and Zhang (2010) say “Competition-based
pricing is the second-most-popular price-setting approach”.
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the economy, it might expect that the average reset price of the economy would be
less than its own price and, consequently, have γi much smaller than one but greater
than zero.26 However, if it expects a much higher average reset price, γi would
be greater than one. Therefore, we can say that γi represents all the subjective
information of firm i on the other firms’ pricing behaviours.27 Lastly, the heuristic
decides firm i’s expectation on the aggregate price level (Pt) as in the same way
of the standard model. As seen above, the heuristic is for the average reset price
(p∗t ) of the economy. However, each individual firm knows the dynamics of Pt as
of (3.5), and therefore, they can have their expectations on Pt as well based on the
expectation on p∗t obtained by using the heuristic. In the sense that the heuristic is
a function of a firm’s own choice (pit), the expectation on Pt is also a function of
its reset price, not a fixed value. This applies to the rational firms in the standard
model as well. They also use (3.5) for the information on Pt, and the information on
p∗t is given by a function of their own optimal prices (pit = p∗t ). The only difference is
that their information on p∗t is true while the information of the firms in this model
is based on their subjective expectations.
3.4 Model
As in the previous chapters, the basic framework of the model in this chapter is the
standard new Keynesian Calvo model. Rational households optimize their decisions
and monetary authority follows a certain interest rule for its policy as in the standard
model. However, as shown below, firms’ pricing behaviours are affected by their non-
rational expectations on the average reset price due to the limited information on
26The positive γi in this example is due to the implicit assumption that each firm does not expect
the price cutting of the adjusting firms, including itself, against expansionary monetary shocks.
27Due to its subjectivity, γ might not be able to be observable in any published data. This can
be an obstacle that hinders empirical analyses on firms’ expectations on the average reset price
represented by γ. One possible way of getting the information on γ is to use the equations (3.5)
and (3.7) jointly. If we could get the information of an individual firm’s ex-ante expectation on
Pt, we would be able to estimate γ indirectly with the published data on Pt−1 and pit using the
equations. However, even though there are many kinds of survey data on inflation expectations,
it is another problem whether we can gather as many data sets as we need in order to secure the
representativeness of the data for all repricing firms.
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other firms’ optimization problems.
3.4.1 Households
As explained in Appendix 1.B of Chapter 1, the rational representative household
chooses the aggregate consumption (ct), the amount of hours of labour supply (ht),
and the real bond holding (bt) following the optimality conditions as
c−σt = λt (3.8)
Qt = βEt
(
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1
λt
)
(3.9)
λt
Wt
Pt
= λtwt = h
%
t , (3.10)
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier of utility maximization problem, Qt is the
price of bonds with a nominal return rate of Q−1t (= Rt), and wt (= Wt/Pt) denotes
real wage.
3.4.2 Monetary Authority and Market Clearing
The policy rule of monetary authority for interest rate (Rt) against monetary shock
(νt) and market clearing conditions (as in Appendix 1.B of Chapter 1) are given as
Rt
R
=
(pit
pi
)ηpi (yt
y
)ηy
(νt)
−1 (3.11)
νt
ν
=
(νt−1
ν
)ρ
exp(et), et ∼ N(0, ς) (3.12)
yt = ct (3.13)
ht = yt, (3.14)
where ρ is the persistence parameter of the shocks.
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3.4.3 Firms
Each of a continuum of firms i ∈ [0, 1] produces its own goods, yit, hiring labour,
hit, through the production technology as
yit = hit.
Each firm i minimizes costs and maximizes its expected profit regarding the pro-
duction to choose its reset price (pit). As explained in Appendix 3.A, the decision
makings on the cost minimization and the profit maximization yields the conditions
as
mct = wt (3.15)
and
p˜t
(
=
pit
Pt
)
=

− 1
f1t
f2t
, (3.16)
where
f1t = λtmctyt + Etθβpi

t+1f1t+1 (3.17)
f2t = λtyt + Etθβpi
−1
t+1f2t+1, (3.18)
and p˜t (= pit/Pt) is the relative optimal price of firm i. However, the information
which firm i has on Pt (and on pit as well) is not complete as shown in Section 3.3.
Hence, the dynamics of the aggregate price level perceived by the firm is modelled
as described in the subsection below.
Dynamics of Aggregate Price Level
Following the standard Calvo framework, only a fraction (1 − θ) of firms are al-
lowed to change their prices, and the rest of the firms are assumed to remain at
their previous level of prices. Therefore, as mentioned above, the definition of the
aggregate price index gives the dynamics of the aggregate price level as in (3.5) and
(3.6). However, because of the lack of knowledge on the other firms’ optimization
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problems, firm i cannot have precise information on the average optimal price, p∗t .
Even though all firms optimize in the same way of profit maximization as rational
firms in the standard model and, therefore, have the same optimality conditions as
in (3.15)∼(3.18), they cannot be sure of this because they are assumed not to know
how the other firms reset their prices. Therefore, they cannot be confident that
they would have the same reset price against monetary shocks, and consequently,
each firm has to have its own expectation on p∗t which is assumed to be established
as in (3.7). With the expectation on p∗t , individual firm i can have its subjective
information on the dynamics of the aggregate price level as a form of
E˜itP
1−
t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)E˜it (p∗t )1− . (3.19)
Dividing both sides of (3.19) and (3.7) by Pt, firm i can get the following equations
in its information set.
1 = θE˜itpi
−1
t + (1− θ)E˜it (p˜t∗)1− (3.20)
and
E˜itp˜t
∗ = E˜it
[
p˜t
γipiγi−1t
]
, (3.21)
where p˜t
∗ (= p∗t /Pt) is the relative average reset price. It is necessary to note that
firm i’s subjective expectation operator, E˜it, is put in front of Pt and pit as well as
p∗t . This means that information on Pt and pit is not given from the market anymore
and that it is obtained through the subjective expectation on p∗t .
3.4.4 Information Set and Price Setting
Each individual firm i is assumed to have all the information on the economy except
for other firms’ reset prices. In other words, from the market, all firms receive
exact information on households’ optimality conditions, (3.8)∼(3.10), policy rule
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of monetary authority, (3.11), monetary shocks, (3.12), and the market clearing
conditions, (3.13)∼(3.14). However, it is assumed that the pricing behaviours of
other firms are unknown, which leads to the lack of information on the average
optimal price, p∗t . This missing information makes each firm have expectation on p∗t
as in (3.7). Also, as we have seen in (3.5), only after the set of expectation
(
E˜itp
∗
t
)
,
the subjective information on Pt comes to each firm i. With such information added
to the existing knowledge on the economy, individual firm i is then able to solve
its optimization problem as the rational firms do in the standard model. More
precisely, for firm i, the two equations of (3.20) and (3.21) which are obtained by
the expectation on p∗t and the other above-mentioned information are incorporated
into an economic model to be solved. The model perceived by firm i consists of the
log-linearized equations of
E˜ityˆt = E˜it
[
yˆt+1 − 1
σ
(
Rˆt − pˆit+1
)]
(3.22)
E˜itRˆt = E˜it [ηpipˆit + ηyyˆt − νˆt] (3.23)
νˆt = ρνˆt−1 + et (3.24)
E˜it ˆ˜pt = E˜it
[
(1− βθ) (σ + %)yˆt + βθ
(
pˆit+1 + ˆ˜pt+1
)]
(3.25)
E˜itpˆit =
1− θ
θ
E˜it ˆ˜p
∗
t (3.26)
E˜it ˆ˜p
∗
t = E˜it
[
γi ˆ˜pt − (1− γi)pˆit
]
. (3.27)
The first equation, (3.22), represents information on the demand side of the economy
which firm i can obtain from (3.8), (3.9), (3.13), and the fact of
(
Q−1t = Rt
)
. The
information on the interest rule of monetary authority, (3.11), and the dynamics
of shocks, (3.12), are given as in (3.23) and (3.24) respectively. Firm i’s pricing
behaviour can be expressed as in (3.25) using (3.10) and (3.13)∼(3.18). Equation
(3.26) represents the subjective information on the dynamics of the aggregate price
level, (3.20), and the irrational expectation on the average reset price, (3.21), is
shown in (3.27).
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As can be seen, all of the above equations except for the dynamics of shocks have
the subjective expectation operator, E˜it, in front of all the variables regardless of
whether they are for current or future period. Also, the rational expectation oper-
ator, Et, disappears even in the equation about the rational household’s behaviour,
(3.22). As mentioned above, the equations above construct the model which firm
i perceives. In other words, firm i chooses its reset price by solving its perceived
model which is the system of above equations. Even though the direct effect of firm
i’s irrational expectation on p∗t , (3.27), is on the aggregate price level as in (3.26),
the dynamics of the aggregate price level indirectly affects all the other variables in
the process of solving the model. That is, all the variables in the equilibrium of the
perceived model are based on firm i’s expectation on the average reset price and,
therefore, is affected by the firm’s bounded rationality. In this sense, the subjective
expectation operator, E˜it, reflects firm i’s expectation on the aggregate variables
based on the belief on the average reset price. However, there is a common aspect
between E˜it and Et. It is that expectations are established ‘rationally’. In other
words, the expectations of both operators coincide with the outcome of the eco-
nomic model perceived by the agents.28 However, the difference between the two
operators is that the economic structure comprehended by the agent with Et is the
real one, which leads to an agreement between the agent’s expectation and the re-
alized one, while the economy perceived by the agent with E˜it is just based on the
subjective belief of the agent, which gives rise to biases of the agent’s expectation
on the aggregate economic variables. Therefore, in the model of this chapter, firm
i’s expectations on aggregate variables do not coincide with the realized one even
though E˜it ensures the consistency between agents’ expectations within the firm’s
perceived model.
28For example, E˜itpˆit+1 has the same value as the equilibrium level of pˆit+1 as a solution of the
perceived model.
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3.4.5 Calculation of Realized Inflation and Output Response
The solution of the perceived model which consists of (3.22)∼(3.27) gives firm i
not only its reset price, but also the equilibrium levels of aggregate price (Pt) and
the output (yt) within the model. However, as mentioned in the above section,
the equilibrium levels do not align with the realized ones of the economy because
the model perceived by firm i might not reflect the true structure of the economy
but is based on its expectation on average reset price as in (3.7). Therefore, even
though firm i expects that the aggregate price level would be decided as in (3.19),
the expected price level can coincide with the realized one only when its expectation
on the average optimal price comes true. Aggregate output level which comes as
an equilibrium of the perceived model is also different from the realized one. By
substituting (3.23) into (3.22), we can see that the equilibrium level of output which
firm i anticipates is given by
E˜ityˆt = E˜it
[
σ
σ + ηy
yˆt+1 − 1
σ + ηy
(ηpipˆit − pˆit+1 − νˆt)
]
. (3.28)
As can be seen, yt is affected by pit and pit+1 which are based on firm i’s expectation
on Pt as in (3.20)∼(3.21). Therefore, the equilibrium level of yt in the model per-
ceived by firm i cannot coincide with the realized one as long as the expected level
of Pt based on E˜itp
∗
t does not match the ex-post aggregate price level after all of the
firms’ price settings are over.
The realized levels of Pt are decided by (3.5) and (3.6), not by (3.7) nor (3.19).
In other words, once each firm sets its price, the average reset price of the economy
is decided as in (3.6), and then, the aggregate price level is calculated as in (3.5).
Consequently, the log-linearized expression for the realized inflation is given by
pˆit =
1− θ
θ
ˆ˜p∗t , (3.29)
where we can find no expectation operator, which means that the variables in the
equation are ex-post facto. The corresponding level of aggregate output is decided
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by the representative rational household whose demand is given by
yˆt = Et
[
σ
σ + ηy
yˆt+1 − 1
σ + ηy
(ηpipˆit − pˆit+1 − νˆt)
]
, (3.30)
which is the log-linearized expression for the combination of (3.8), (3.9), (3.11), and
(3.13). The expectation operator, Et, in the equation is for the rational households,
not for firms. Since the households are assumed to have perfect information on
the economy including firms’ boundedly rational pricing behaviours, they can have
correct expectations on pit+1 and yt+1.
3.5 Simulation Results
The model is simulated through two stages. In the first stage, the reset prices of
individual firms are obtained by the simulation of the model perceived by each firm i,
as in (3.22)∼(3.27), against positive monetary shocks.29 The second stage is for the
calculation of the realized outcome of the economy as in Section 3.4.5 above. Once
the reset prices, pit, are obtained in the first stage, we can calculate the average of
the reset price, p∗t , using (3.6). And then, equation (3.5) gives the ex-post aggregate
price level. Consequently, we can obtain the realized value of inflation rate and
aggregate output using (3.29) and (3.30), respectively.
The following sections show various simulation results with different assumptions
on γi which plays a decisive role in firm i’s expectation on p
∗
t : the same γ among
firms, the distributed γi across firms, and the updated distribution of γi. Firstly,
the assumption of the same γ allows us to have a simple understanding on how the
directions of firms’ expectations affect the economy. However, in the real world, the
expectations are usually not the same.30 Some firms can have lower expectations
while others have higher ones. What would happen if the average of the different
expectations is the same as that of the fully rational firms? Can we find any differ-
29Dynare with Matlab is used for the simulation.
30For example, Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) present the micro evidence that the interquar-
tile range of inflation expectations is 1.5%∼2.5% among experts and 0%∼5% among the populace.
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ence from the standard model even in such a case? The simulation with the second
assumption of distributed γi enables us to answer the question. We can check what
the aggregate effect would be in the case where there are different expectations and
their directions cancel one another out. In other words, we can show whether the
heterogeneity itself makes a difference even if the aggregate level of expectation is
the same as in the standard model. However, the simulations with the first and
second assumptions do not allow an adjustment of a firm’s expectation. If a firm
finds any discrepancy between its expectation and the outcome of the economy, it
might want to adjust its expectation. The simulation with the last assumption of
updated γi shows how the model is affected in such a case where firms reflect the
realized level of aggregate price in the previous period.
3.5.1 The Same γ among Firms
The first simulation is with the assumption that γi is the same among all firms
31
for the simplicity of the model, which means all the repricing firms set the same
optimal price. Under this assumption, the model is simulated with arbitrary values
of γ, which are 0.8 and 1.2, and compared to the benchmark standard Calvo model.
The impulse responses of the aggregate output, inflation and firm’s reset price are
given as in Figure 3.1.32 The simulation result shows that γ equal to 0.8, which
is less than one, makes a higher reset price, higher inflation, and a lower output
response compared to the cases of γ = 1.2 and the standard model.33
Mechanism of γ on Firm’s Optimal Price
From (3.7), we can find that an individual firm with lower γ expects a lower average
optimal price and, therefore, anticipates a lower aggregate price level compared to
the case of higher γ. Also, the firm will expect a much higher output with the
31With this assumption, the subscript of γi is removed in this section.
32The inflation and output responses shown in this and below sections are all realized outcome
of the true model, not the ex-ante equilibrium level of the model perceived by each firm.
33Note that the model with γ = 1 is nothing but the standard model. As can be seen in (3.7),
with γ = 1, we can have E˜itp
∗
t = pit which gives the same dynamics of aggregate price level,
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)p1−it , as in the standard model.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Response Functions with Different γ to Monetary Shocks
expectation of lower price level. This can be easily confirmed by rearranging some
equations in the firm’s information set. Putting (3.27) into (3.26), we can have the
following equation.
E˜itpˆit =
γ(1− θ)
1− γ(1− θ)E˜it
ˆ˜pt
=
1− θ˜
θ˜
E˜it ˆ˜pt, (3.31)
where θ˜ is defined by 1−γ(1−θ). Substituting (3.31) into (3.25) yields the following
NKPC.
E˜itpˆit = E˜it
[
(1− βθ)(1− θ˜)(σ + %)
θ˜
yˆt +
βθ
θ˜
pˆit+1
]
(3.32)
For comparison with the standard model, we can express the above equation as
E˜itpˆit = E˜it
[
(1− β′θ˜)(1− θ˜)(σ + %)
θ˜
yˆt + β
′pˆit+1
]
, (3.33)
where β′ is defined by βθ/θ˜. Above NKPC is the same as that of the standard
model with θ˜ and β′ except that there are subjective expectation operators (E˜it)
instead of the rational expectation operator (Et), which means that the equation
comes from firm i’s perception on the economy, not from the true economic model.
In the case of γ < 1, we have θ˜ > θ and β′ < β. This indicates that the above
NKPC has a gentler slope and a lower intercept when γ is less than one, compared
to that of the standard model. This shows that when a firm expects a lower average
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reset price than its own, the economy which the firm perceives is expected to have
a lower aggregate price level and a higher output level as an equilibrium compared
to that in the standard model.
The expectation of a lower price level leads to the anticipation of a higher relative
price (pit/Pt) at a specific level of reset price, which gives a firm an incentive to lower
its price. At the same time, however, the firm with lower γ expects a higher level
of output as we have seen above.34 The higher level of output means that the
firm faces higher demand, and this gives the firm an incentive to raise its price.
Therefore, we can think of the two effects of lowering γ on the reset price which
have clearly opposite directions. Whether which effect is greater depends on the
size of parameters of the model. For a better understanding, suppose a simple case
where there is no price stickiness (θ = 0).35 Using (3.8), (3.10) and (3.13)∼(3.18),
we can have firm i’s reset price for the simple case of the flexible economy as in
pit =

− 1Pty
σ+%
t . (3.34)
As can be seen, firm’s reset price depends on the level of aggregate price and output
of the economy which it expects. When an expectation on Pt is very low, a firm
lowers its price, but the price is raised when the firm expects a high level of yt. In
particular, we can find that the effect of higher expectation on yt is subject to the
level of σ and %.
If the economy is not so sensitive with the parameters having a high value,
the effect of change in demand is usually greater than that of the relative price
when the shocks are persistent as in the model of this chapter with ρ = 0.9. It is
because, with the persistent shocks, the change in demand is extended to the far
future, which means the forward-looking firm should take account of a much larger
amount of change in demand in advance. Furthermore, the incentive to raise price
34For example, in the economy where Fisher’s quantity theory of money applies, agent A with
expectation of higher inflation will naturally expect lower output level than agent B who expects
relatively lower inflation, given the same observation of monetary expansion.
35Even in this case, as long as γ is less than one, we have θ˜ = 1−γ > 0 which means the economy
a firm perceives is the same as the standard one with a certain positive level of price stickiness.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions with σ = % = 0.2
against the expected increase in demand is amplified with price stickiness. Since
firms are concerned with the possibility of not being able to adjust their prices in
subsequent periods under the Calvo-type price stickiness, they want to set much
higher prices in advance than needed in the current period. Therefore, the above
incentive to raise price becomes greater to the extent to which the firm sets a higher
price than the standard model as we have seen in Figure 3.1. However, if σ and
% have extremely small values like σ = % = 0.2, for example, the effect of increase
in demand gets smaller compared to the relative price effect, and therefore, firms’
reset prices become lower than the standard model as shown in Figure 3.2 which
demonstrates the opposite results to Figure 3.1. Firstly, lower σ represents the
elastic responsiveness of consumption growth to the change of real interest rate.
Since the real interest rate declines with the increase in price level, we can expect
that the rise in a firm’s price leads to a much smaller increase in future consumption
compared to the current one. In a firm’s viewpoint, this means that the importance
of future demand gets smaller, and hence, the firm does not have such high incentive
to raise price in advance even with the possibility of not being able to change the
price in subsequent periods. Secondly, the lower level of % means that household’s
labour supply responds elastically to the change in real wage. Therefore, with the
rise in firms’ prices which leads to a lower level of real wage, the labour supply
decreases sharply. Since the level of labour supply is the same as the aggregate
demand in the equilibrium of the model (ht = ct), the decrease in labour supply
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means lower demand level, and therefore, firms will hesitate in raising their prices.
After all, because of these two effects of low σ and %, a firm’s incentive to raise its
price becomes very low compared to the case of higher values of the parameters.
Therefore, in the case of low level of σ and %, the effect of higher relative price
dominates that of the expected increase in demand. However, as addressed above,
as long as the parameters do not deviate too far from the standard value as in
numerous literature, the latter overwhelms the former as shown in Figure 3.1 in
which the model is simulated with σ = % = 1.
3.5.2 Different γ with Different Firms
In the previous section, we assumed the same γ for all repricing firms. As mentioned
above, the value of γi represents the information which firm i has regarding the
expectation on the average reset price. Therefore, the same γ means that all firms
have the same information about p∗t . However, if each firm has a different ability
in calculating the complicated problem, and therefore, if each firm has different
information in expecting p∗t , γi will be different among the repricing firms. For
example, some firms have lower expectations on the average reset price, whereas
others have higher ones compared to their own reset prices. In some cases, all the
directions of different expectations can cancel one another out, and the average level
of expectations can be the same as that of the rational firms in the standard model
in which γ is equal to one.
We have seen in the section above that firms with γ < 1 set much higher reset
prices compared to the standard model. However, we have also seen the opposite
result with the firm which has γ > 1. Therefore, we can expect that a mixture of
firms’ expectations with opposite directions makes the significance of the results in
the above section less meaningful. If a firm’s response is linearly proportional to the
level of γ, there might not be any difference from the standard model in the above
mentioned case where the average expectation is the same as that of the rational
firms due to the differences in expectations being offset. However, if the effect of γ
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Figure 3.3: Reset Price with Different γ in the First Period after Shocks
on a firm’s reset price is not linear, the heterogeneity of firms’ expectations itself can
make a meaningful difference from the standard model. In order to check whether
there is a significant effect of the heterogeneity in expectations and how the effect, if
any, varies in accordance with the distribution of expectations, this section assumes
the above mentioned case. That is, γ in this section reflects the circumstance where
all firms have different expectations but the same average level as the standard
model. For this purpose, each firm i’s γi is assumed to be drawn from the following
uniform distribution as
γi ∼ U (a, 2− a) , (3.35)
where 0 < a < 1 is the lower limit of the interval.36 The selection of uniform distri-
bution is for simplification of the model, which means that γi is evenly distributed
among all firms. Also, we can find that the mean of the distribution is set to be
equal to one for the assumption that the aggregate level of expectations makes no
difference from the standard model.
Figure 3.3 shows the level of reset price of firm i with γi in the first period after
expansionary monetary shocks. As we have seen in the previous section, with the
standard values of σ and %, a firm with lower γi sets a higher price as in the left
panel of Figure 3.3. However, as also discussed above, the right panel shows higher
36This does not mean that each individual firm knows the distribution. The distribution is just
a tool for the assumption that γi of an individual firm is not the same for all firms.
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reset price with higher γi when σ and % have very low values. Despite the opposite
results of the two panels, it is common that the level of reset price is convex with
respect to γi, which means that Jensen’s inequality holds as
g
(∫ 2−a
a
γidi
)
≤
∫ 2−a
a
g(γi)di, (3.36)
where g is the function which relates γi to the reset price of firm i. In other words,
both the panels of Figure 3.3 show that the size of increase in the reset price gets
bigger as γ moves to one side. This means, in the case with the standard values
of σ and % for example, that lower expectation on the average reset price (γi < 1)
makes a bigger difference to a firm’s reset price from the standard model than when
expecting a higher average reset price (γj > 1), even if the distances of the two
opposite expectations from that of the rational firms in the standard model are the
same
(
γi+γj
2 = 1
)
.
As mentioned in the previous section, a firm with γ < 1 has an incentive to
raise its price in anticipation of demand increase. Also, we have seen that the
incentive is amplified by price stickiness which makes the firm have concerns about
having no chance to change price in subsequent periods and forces it to set its price
high in advance. However, these two mechanisms operate differently when a firm
expects a higher average reset price with γ > 1. Firstly, the incentive to raise price
against the expected increase in demand becomes very small. It is because the
firm’s higher expectation on average reset price leads to the anticipation of higher
inflation response which is expected to absorb a majority of shocks. After all, the
firm will expect just a slight increase in demand by the expansionary money shocks
and, consequently, will not need to set a high price.37 Thus, the firm sets a much
lower price compared to that of the rational firms in the standard model. However,
the difference is not as big as that of the case where a firm expects a lower average
37Expectation of high inflation response leads to an anticipation of low relative price which
allows a further raising of reset price. However, as mentioned in the section above, this effect
cannot dominate the effect from the expected change in demand when the shocks are expected to
be persistent as in this model.
92
reset price. It is because the second mechanism of price stickiness still operates in
the same direction as in the case of γ < 1. In other words, the firm still has to worry
about not being able to adjust price in the future, and this concern forces the firm
not to have its price at a very low level. As a result, the circumstance of sticky price
backs up the level of the firm’s reset price and does not allow it to be further away
from that of the standard model compared to the case of γ < 1.
As seen above, price stickiness augments the incentive to raise price when a firm
expects a lower average reset price, while it dampens the tendency of price to fall in
the opposite case. Such different operation of price stickiness produces the convex
line as in Figure 3.3 and makes the inequality of (3.36) hold. Since the mean of γi
is set to be one, which gives the same level of reset price as in the standard model,
the above inequality means that the average reset price (p∗t ) in the economy with
distributed γ is higher than that of the standard model, regardless of the parameters,
σ and %. In other words, if firms’ expectations on p∗t are not homogeneous, even
if the average of expectations is the same as in the standard model, firms’ reset
prices are much more responsive against monetary shocks, compared to those of the
standard rational firms.
In the far right panel of Figure 3.4, it is shown that the impulse response of the
average reset price of the firms which have different γi is higher than that of the
standard model when simulated with a = 0.05 against positive monetary shocks.
The two left panels demonstrate the realized inflation and output responses calcu-
lated with the average reset price, which shows that the real effect of money in the
economy with distributed γ is much less than that of the economy of rational firms
with perfect information as in the standard model. Also, we can find that this result
holds with any level of parameters as there is little difference between the two cases
of standard parameters (σ = % = 1, upper panels) and low parameters (σ = % = 0.2,
lower panels), which confirms the discussion above.
The degree of deviation of the model with distributed γ from the standard model
depends on the shape of the distribution of γ. Though we have a considerable drop
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response Functions with Distributed γ
in the output response compared to the standard model in the above simulation with
the assumption of uniform distribution, the size of the drop can be very small if γi is
concentrated around the mean, which is one in our case, like the normal distribution.
Also, if the probability density function is much higher around both ends of the
distribution curve, we will have a much larger drop in the output response. However,
no matter what the distribution is, it is always true that the output response is
smaller than that of the standard model as long as the distribution has a positive
variance with mean equal to one. This is because Jensen’s inequality still holds with
any probability density function (f) as long as the function (g), which relates γi to
firm i’s reset price, is convex as
g
(∫ 2−a
a
γif(γi)di
)
≤
∫ 2−a
a
g(γi)f(γi)di, (3.37)
and the convexity of the function g is guaranteed by the Calvo-type price stickiness
as reviewed above. This result implies that the effect of monetary policy can be
very small when analysed with any price stickiness model featured by the Calvo
mechanism under the circumstance of heterogeneity in firms’ expectations on other
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firm’s pricing behaviours and average level of reset prices.
3.5.3 Adjustment of γ
In the above sections, it is assumed that once a firm i sets its expectation on p∗t
with a certain level of γi, the γi is held constant. In other words, individual firms
do not adjust their γ even after they observe that the realized p∗t is different from
their expectations. For example, in the above simulation in which all firms have
different γ evenly distributed from 0.05 to 1.95, it can be shown that the firm with
the smallest γ (= 0.05) sets its optimal price as 0.07238 in the first period after the
shock. This means that the firm expects the average reset price would be 0.0036
(= 0.05×0.072). However, the realized average of all firms’ reset prices is calculated
to be 0.047 and can be observed before the price setting for the next period. It
is not so realistic to assume that the firm ignores the discrepancy between its ex-
ante expectation and ex-post observed value of p∗t . Therefore, in this sense, it is
assumed in this section that firms update their expectations on p∗t by adjusting γ
after observing the realized values of the main variables at the end of each period.
Even though we cannot know exactly how γi is adjusted using the information
on the realized outcome of the economy because we have not modelled how firm i
sets its γi at the moment of price setting, this section assumes that firms follow the
very basic learning scheme as
γi,t = γi,t−1 + φ
(
γRi,t−1 − γi,t−1
)
, (3.38)
where φ is the parameter deciding the speed of adjustment, and γRi,t denotes the
realized value of γi which can be observed just after the price setting in period t. In
the case above for example, after price setting of ln pi,1 = 0.072 with γi,1 = 0.05 at
the end of period t = 1, the firm i observes ln p∗1 = 0.047. Then using the following
38From now onward, the values given are for the logged variables, which means ln pit = 0.072 in
this case.
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equation as in
E˜it ln p
∗
t = E˜it [γi ln pit + (1− γi) lnPt−1] , (3.39)
which can be obtained by taking logarithms of both sides of (3.7), the firm can
calculate the ex-post value of γRi,1 at 0.653.
39 Therefore, according to (3.38), the
firm’s updated γ at the beginning of period t = 2, (γi,2), becomes 0.05 + 0.603φ. As
can be seen, the updated level of γ is affected by the parameter, φ. In other words,
depending on the speed of adjustment, the above γi,2 can be any number within the
interval of (0.05, 0.653).40
We can think of two extreme cases with regard to the adjustment speed. If the
value of γRi,t contains lots of information on the true value of γ, firms will have φ
very close to one. However, if firms consider that there is much more information
on the true γ outside the economic model they perceive, then φ would be closer to
zero. As mentioned in the previous sections, γ contains the subjective information
of individual firms’ views on the economy. More precisely, each firm i might have its
own perception on how many firms have different optimization problem from its own
which is the maximization of expected profit, how the different pricing behaviours
look like, and what other firms’ perceptions on those factors would be. The γi
represents a subjective perception of firm i on such information in connection with
the average reset price. Such nature of γ shows that there is quite a psychological
influence in firms’ setting of γi. Furthermore, as long as each individual firm thinks
that there are many firms with different pricing behaviours which might be irrational,
each firm will not think that a fixed true value of γ exists. In other words, firms might
believe that lots of irrational firms in the economy may set their prices differently
every period relying on psychological factors, and accordingly, each firm might try to
set an optimum period-by-period γi,t thinking that it best explains the relationship
between the average reset price and the individual firm’s own price. In this case,
firms will not think that γRi,t reflects the true economy because γ
R
i,t could be plausible
39The value of aggregate price level in the previous period is already known as lnP0 = 0 with
the assumption that steady state value of price before the shock is one. Therefore, γRi,1 is obtained
by solving the equation, 0.047 = γRi,1 × 0.072 + (1− γRi,1)× 0.
40Note that φ is assumed to be between zero and one.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Response Functions with Updated Distribution of γ
only under the assumption that true value of γ exists and that all information on
the true value lie in the perceived model. In this sense, firms might put much more
weight on the information out of their perceived model rather than on the realized
value of γRi,t. In the extreme case, firms might not reflect the outcome of γ
R
i,t at all
and have φ equal to zero.41
Following such reasoning, the model is simulated with a very low value of φ = 0.1.
Figure 3.5 shows that the real effect of money is still smaller than that of the standard
model with the low adjustment speed of distribution of γ. Compared to Figure
3.4 which is for the constant distribution of γ, we can see that all the variables
converge fast to those of the standard model, which is the natural outcome of the
adjustment of γ. As long as firm i is assumed to use the learning scheme, (3.38), all
the information used for the update of γi is from the inside of the model and entirely
reflected into γRi . Therefore, even though φ is set very low for the psychological
aspects of γi, γ
R
i naturally converges to one in the end unless φ is equal to zero
because all firms in the model are assumed to be the same by construction. This
makes the responses of the model closer to those of the standard model as seen in
Figure 3.5.
41Even in this case, it need not be the case where each firm maintains its initial γ. Rather, it
can be that firms adjust their γ, but the whole distribution of γ does not change. For example,
the firm with γ = 0.05 might change to γ = 1.95 after observing much higher average reset price
than its expectation, while another firm adjusts its initial γ equal to 1.95 to 0.05 for reason to the
contrary, which makes the distribution of γ invariable.
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The interesting result is that a hump-shaped output response is shown. As
discussed in the previous section, the realized output level is decided by the repre-
sentative rational household. Even though the household is assumed to have perfect
information on the true economy, it can be an issue whether it has knowledge on
firms’ behaviours in updating γ as well. If the household has no information on the
adjustment of γ in advance, the output level would also be adjusted every period
according to the update of γ, which leads to the hump shape of the output response
as shown in the dashed line of Figure 3.5. However, if full information on the update
schedule of γ is assumed to be given, the household demands much more in advance
because it anticipates the fast convergence of inflation in the future, as shown in the
dotted line of the figure.
3.6 Conclusion
Various versions of the standard New Keynesian models presented in great amounts
of literature generate the non-neutrality of money by featuring price stickiness of
individual firms with the classic assumption of rational agents who have perfect
information on the economy. However, in the real world, it is almost impossible
to find such agents with omniscience about the economy. This chapter examines
whether the real effect of money can still be guaranteed by price stickiness even in
the circumstance where the requirement of full information for rational agents is
not satisfied. Specifically, when firms face the limited information on other firms’
pricing behaviours, it is shown that firms’ reset prices against monetary shocks can
be much more volatile than that of the standard model depending on their sub-
jective expectations on the average reset price. Consequently, it is demonstrated
that the real effect of money could be very small even with price stickiness of in-
dividual firms. Furthermore, as long as the firms’ subjective expectations are fully
heterogeneous, even if they match the true feature of the economy on average as
the rational firms do in the standard model, it is shown that the interaction of
heterogeneity in expectations with price stickiness can make the price much more
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volatile, and therefore, the real effect of money is reduced. This implies that price
stickiness can lose its position as the main factor of the non-neutrality of money just
with the firms’ heterogeneous expectations on the economy. Therefore, economists
and central banks need to research more on the distribution of the economic agents’
expectations, and they should try to find another factor which brings about the
non-neutrality of money directly rather than price stickiness.
In spite of some implications above, this chapter has several limitations. First
of all, the model in this chapter is based on the assumption of boundedly rational
firms. As in numerous literature, the wilderness of bounded rationality can be an
issue. Even though the very basic learning mechanism is introduced in this chapter,
the psychological nature of heuristics, which firms have for their expectations, are
vulnerable to criticism on the wilderness of heuristics. The best way to avoid the
criticism would be to establish a model based on rational firms. In this sense, the very
next attempt for future research would be to set up a model in which fully rational
firms, facing imperfect information on other firms’ optimization problems, set much
more volatile optimal prices compared to the standard model. Secondly, aside from
the issue of wilderness of bounded rationality, this model lacks the micro-foundation
on firms’ subjective expectations. Even though it is assumed that firms have simple
heuristics in expecting the average reset price, there is no further explanation on
how the parameter, γ, which is the critical factor of the heuristic, is decided. As a
result, the update mechanism of the parameter could not be more exquisite. If future
research gives more detailed micro-foundation on the parameter, this model would
be much richer than now with the equipment of much elaborate learning mechanism
for the update of heuristics, which would be helpful in limiting the wilderness of
bounded rationality as well.
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Appendix 3.A
Cost Minimization
Taking the real wage as given, firm i hires an optimal level of labour by minimizing
the production costs as
min
hit
Wt
Pt
hit s.t. yit = hit,
where Wt is the nominal wage. The first order condition with respect to hit yields
ξt =
Wt
Pt
,
where ξt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Since ξt means the additional real cost of
producing an extra unit, we can interpret ξt as the real marginal cost, mct, as
mct =
Wt
Pt
= wt, (3.40)
where wt denotes the real wage.
Profit Maximization
Each firm adjusts its price by maximizing the present discounted value of expected
profits as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+sPt+s
(
pit
Pt+s
−mct+s
)
yit+s.
Given the demand curve, yit = (Pit/Pt)
−yt, we can re-express this optimization
problem as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+sPt+s
[(
pit
Pt+s
)1−
−mct+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−]
yt+s.
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Taking the derivative with respect to pit gives the first order condition as.
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−
yt+s
[
1− 
− 1mct+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−1]
= 0, (3.41)
which can be re-expressed by
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−
yt+s =

− 1Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+smct+s
(
pit
Pt+s
)−−1
yt+s.
(3.42)
Using Qt,t+s = β
sEt
(
Pt
Pt+s
λt+s
λt
)
and multiplying both sides by p+1it /Pt, we can
rearrange this as
p˜t
(
=
pit
Pt
)
=

− 1
f1t
f2t
, (3.43)
where p˜t is the relative optimal price, and
f1t = Et
∞∑
s=0
θsβsλt+smct+syt+s
(
Pt+s
Pt
)
(3.44)
f2t = Et
∞∑
s=0
θsβsλt+syt+s
(
Pt+s
Pt
)−1
. (3.45)
Expanding the summation notation in (3.44), we get
f1t = λtmctyt + Etθβλt+1mct+1yt+1
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
+ Etθ
2β2λt+2mct+2yt+2
(
Pt+2
Pt
)
+ · · · . (3.46)
Shifting one period forward yields
f1t+1 = λt+1mct+1yt+1 + Et+1θβλt+2mct+2yt+2
(
Pt+2
Pt+1
)
+ Et+1θ
2β2λt+3mct+3yt+3
(
Pt+3
Pt+2
)
+ · · · . (3.47)
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Multiplying both sides by θβ
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
, we can have
θβ
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
f1t+1 = θβλt+1mct+1yt+1
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
+ Et+1θ
2β2λt+2mct+2yt+2
(
Pt+2
Pt
)
+ Et+1θ
3β3λt+3mct+3yt+3
(
Pt+3
Pt
)
+ · · · . (3.48)
Taking expectation, Et, on both sides and using the law of iterated expectations,
we can get
Etθβ
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
f1t+1 = Etθβλt+1mct+1yt+1
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
+ Etθ
2β2λt+2mct+2yt+2
(
Pt+2
Pt
)
+ Etθ
3β3λt+3mct+3yt+3
(
Pt+3
Pt
)
+ · · · . (3.49)
From (3.46) and (3.49), we have
f1t = λtmctyt + Etθβpi

t+1f1t+1, (3.50)
where pit (= Pt/Pt−1) is the inflation rate. Following the same logic, (3.45) can be
re-expressed by
f2t = λtyt + Etθβpi
−1
t+1f2t+1. (3.51)
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Appendix 3.B
From (3.1), we know
pit = f (Pt, yt,mct, EtQt,t+s, EtPt+s, Etyt+s, Etmct+s) , (3.52)
where s > 0. Using (1.15) and (1.22)∼(1.24) of Chapter 1, we can have
Qt(≡ Qt,t+1) = βEt
(
Pt
Pt+1
y−σt+1
y−σt
)
(3.53)
mct = y
σ+%
t . (3.54)
Also, with (1.25) of Chapter 1 and Rt = 1/Qt, we get
yt =
(
Qyηy
νt
Qt
(
pi
pit
)ηpi) 1ηy
. (3.55)
Substituting (3.53) into (3.55) and using pit = Pt/Pt−1, we can find that yt is a
function of Pt−1, Pt, Pt+1, yt+1, and νt as
yt = f (Pt−1, Pt, EtPt+1, Etyt+1, νt) . (3.56)
If we shift the above equation one period forward, we obtain
yt+1 = f (Pt, Pt+1, EtPt+2, Etyt+2, Etνt+1) , (3.57)
and putting this equation into (3.56) gives
yt = f (Pt−1, Pt, EtPt+1, EtPt+2, Etyt+2, νt, Etνt+1) . (3.58)
Iteration of this process yields
yt = f (Pt−1, Pt, EtPt+s, νt, Etνt+s) , (3.59)
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where s > 0. With (3.53), (3.54), and (3.59), we can re-express (3.52) as
pit = f (Pt−1, Pt, EtPt+s, νt, Etνt+s) , (3.60)
where s > 0. Given that Pt−1 and νt can be observable at the moment of price
setting in period t, we can have
pit = f(Pt, EtΩt+s), (3.61)
where Ωt+s = {Pt+s, νt+s} and s > 0.
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